

PARTIES AS PROGRAMMATIC AGENTS

A Test of Institutional Theory in Brazil

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ABSTRACT

The received wisdom in the study of Brazilian parties holds that Brazilian electoral law precludes programmatic parties. Yet we have little comprehensive data on party behavior in Brazil, and the electoral law thesis of party weakness has never been directly tested. I test the theory by examining party behavior in two periods of democratic rule (1945–64 and 1989–2002) in which electoral law is constant. I examine several features of governing and opposition coalition behavior, including inter-coalition divisiveness and intra-coalition unity in legislative voting, and party alliances in legislative elections and governing cabinets. All three indicators demonstrate more programmatic behavior in the current period, despite the constancy of electoral law. The results indicate that Brazilian parties are more coherent collective actors than previously recognized, and that scholars must augment institutional analysis with other variables in order to develop a general theory of party behavior.

KEY WORDS ■ Brazil ■ electoral law ■ institutions ■ parties

Scholars have long condemned Brazilian parties as undisciplined and feckless – little more than clusters of particularistic legislators and lacking collective identity (Ames, 1995a, b, 2001; Geddes, 1994; Geddes and Ribeiro Neto, 1992; Hagopian, 1996; Mainwaring, 1992, 1995, 1999; Mainwaring and Perez-Liñán, 1997; Sartori, 1994; Shugart and Carey, 1992). Additionally, it is commonly argued that Brazil's electoral institutions are the chief cause of its weak parties. Recently, however, new evidence has emerged that calls this unanimously held view into question: systematic empirical studies have shown that Brazilian parties' unity in legislative voting has increased significantly in the current period (1989 to the present), as compared to the earlier period of democracy (1945–64).¹ These findings have sparked a lively debate centered on some of the most enduring

questions in the comparative study of parties: how can we most accurately assess the degree to which parties are meaningful collective actors that offer voters alternative national policy programs? And, what are the key causal forces driving parties to organize around national legislative programs?

Despite a wealth of new studies on Brazilian parties, important gaps remain. Most importantly, we lack a direct test of the argument that Brazil's legislators fail to organize around national programs due to the individualistic incentives created by electoral law (Ames, 1995a, b, 2001; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Geddes, 1994; Geddes and Ribeiro Neto, 1992; Mainwaring, 1999; Shugart and Carey, 1992). We also need more systematic investigation of the key features of Brazilian party behavior commonly employed to assess their role as meaningful collective actors offering voters alternative national legislative programs.

This article seeks to contribute to the theory of party behavior as well as to the specific debate regarding the performance of Brazilian parties. I provide a direct test of the institutional theory of party behavior by examining party behavior in two periods of democratic rule (1945–64 and 1989 to the present) in which electoral law remained unchanged. Since Brazil is a multiparty regime, I argue that we must examine the behavior of governing and opposition *coalitions* in order to assess the record of agents which implement legislative programs. In addition to Rice Indices for governing and opposition coalitions, I examine inter-coalition divisiveness, including the number of party (coalition) votes as a percentage of roll calls, and the index of likeness, in order to provide a more complete characterization of party behavior in the legislature.² I also examine two other contexts in which we can assess the programmatic coherence of Brazilian parties: the types of governing alliances made in the formation of cabinets, and the electoral alliances formed between parties in elections for federal deputy.

The evidence reinforces the recent finding of a significant change in party behavior across the two periods. In the earlier period, inter-coalition divisiveness and intra-coalition unity were both quite low, whereas in the later period both have risen substantially. Moreover, executive cabinets in the latter period have more closely approximated minimum winning coalitions, and both cabinets and electoral coalitions are considerably more ideologically consistent. Given the lack of change in electoral rules, the findings also suggest that additional variables, in addition to institutions, must be considered if we are to gain a complete understanding of the determinants of party behavior.

The article proceeds as follows. The first section provides some brief background on the two periods of democracy in Brazil, while the second section reviews the existing literature. In the third section I test institutional theory with new empirical data from both periods of democracy in Brazil. The final section concludes.

1. Two Periods of Democratic Rule in Brazil: 1945–64 and 1989 to the Present

Brazil was under democratic rule between 1945 and 1964, and since 1989, when direct election of the president was re-instituted. The vast majority of institutional rules are constant across the two periods, including presidentialism, bicameralism (a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate), federalism, and open-list proportional representation. Both periods were characterized by a multiparty legislature, as can be seen in Tables 1 and 2.

In 1964, a military coup overturned the democratic regime, and Brazil did not return to fully democratic rule again until 1989, with the direct popular election of the president for the first time in almost three decades.

The party system that took shape in the late 1980s in Brazil had many similarities with the earlier period, with one important exception: the average fragmentation of the legislature has increased from approximately four to about seven in the current period (Amorim Neto, 1998).

Table 1. Seat shares per party (%) in the Chamber of Deputies (1946–1963)

	LEFT					RIGHT
	PTB	PSP	PR	PSD	PDC	UDN
1946	7.7	0.7	2.4	52.8	0.7	26.9
1951	16.8	7.9	5.8	36.8	0.6	26.6
1955	17.2	9.8	5.8	35.0	0.6	22.7
1959	20.2	7.7	5.2	35.3	2.1	21.5
1963	28.4	5.1	1.0	28.8	4.9	22.2

Source: Hippólito (1985: 58).

Table 2. Seat shares per party (%) in the Chamber of Deputies (1991–2003)

	LEFT				RIGHT*	
	PT	PDT	PSDB	PMDB	PFL	PDS/PPR/PPB
1991	7.0	9.1	7.4	21.5	16.5	8.3
1995	9.5	6.6	12.1	20.8	17.3	10.1
1999	11.3	4.9	19.3	16.0	20.7	11.7
2003	17.7	4.1	13.8	14.4	16.3	9.6

* This placement of the parties on the spectrum follows Limongi and Figueiredo (1995) and Mainwaring (1995).

Source: Nicolau (1998: 78) for 1991, 1995, www.tse.gov.br for 1999, 2003.

2. Brazilian Parties: An Apparent Paucity of Programs

The two most prominent proponents of the weakness of Brazilian parties have greatly enhanced our knowledge of the Brazilian party system. Ames's (2001) path-breaking book, *The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil*, has as its core the link between individual legislators' campaign strategies and their behavior in congress. Mainwaring's (1999) rich and insightful study focuses on party organization and the institutionalization of the party system as a whole. Both authors argue that Brazilian parties are undisciplined to the point of being incapable of offering voters national policy alternatives.

Ames presents two types of analysis to support his argument that Brazilian parties lack discipline. First, he examines the degree to which presidents are able to achieve their legislative agenda, and, second, he provides a multivariate analysis of the factors that determine legislators' voting behavior. The study of presidents' legislative success is based on an analysis of how presidents' legislative proposals fare in congress. As Ames demonstrates, the first three presidents, Collor, Franco and Cardoso, failed to achieve important components of their legislative agenda (2001: 191–204). Yet these 'failures' must be contextualized in two ways. First, key reforms that were diluted or failed in their first attempt, including fiscal, tax, pension and administrative are deeply structural and have an enormous distributional impact. Most analysts agree that measures with highly concentrated costs and highly diffuse benefits, certainly the case with these reforms, are difficult to adopt in any political system (Arnold, 1990). Moreover, these structural problems date to the previous democratic regime, if not before. It is, thus, reasonable to expect that sufficient consensus on an acceptable package might well only evolve over time and after several trials. And, indeed, this is precisely what we observe.

Collor reformed trade policy and some aspects of public administration, but failed to control state and municipal finances and thus was unable to tame inflation. Franco laid the foundation for macroeconomic stability through reprogramming federal transfers to the states, tax increases and initial privatization. Cardoso succeeded in conquering inflation through banking reform, federal control of state and municipal finances, wage restraint in the public sector and in the minimum wage, extensive privatization, and a variety of other important measures. At the same time, he achieved only minimal pension reform and no tax reform. Yet, Lula, the current president, has succeeded in the first phase of deep pension reform, limiting new public employees to a basic minimum pension from the state, financed by worker contributions. He has also made progress on tax reform, including national unification of state tax codes. The fact that these deeply structural reforms are advanced with each successive administration suggests that it is the nature of the reforms that has confounded quick solutions, rather than factors endemic to the party system.

The second component of Ames's analysis of party discipline is a multivariate regression to probe the impact of a range of variables on rank and file voting, including party leadership recommendations, seniority, rank on party list and receipt of pork. Ames concludes that party leadership recommendations on contested votes have little influence on rank and file voting (2001: 214–15).

Ames's results, however, are contingent on his coding of contested and uncontested votes, which overlooks important differences in how parties organize to offer legislative alternatives in two-party and multiparty regimes. Ames's definition of a contested vote is adapted from Cox and McCubbins (1993), which examines party behavior in the United States (2001: 205). Cox and McCubbins define a party leadership vote in the United States as one in which the party leadership of the two parties oppose one another. In a two-party system, this definition necessarily captures competition between the agents representing alternative legislative programs. The analog in a multiparty system must take into account coalition dynamics.

In multiparty regimes, it requires a coalition of parties to form a legislative majority capable of passing a legislative program. To achieve their legislative goals, the governing coalition must vote in a unified fashion, and it is typically opposed by opposition parties which represent alternative legislative programs. Thus, the votes on which the parties in the governing coalition make the same recommendation, while those in the opposition make the opposite recommendation, would be the relevant analog in a multiparty regime of a contested vote in a two-party regime. Ames, however, does not consider the government or opposition status of parties in his coding, and codes contested votes simply as those with differences in party leadership recommendations. He thus codes votes in which the leadership of the three major parties (PFL, PMDB and PSDB) makes the same recommendation as uncontested. But the PFL, PMDB and PSDB were coalition partners in the government in six of the eight years covered in his analysis. By coding votes in which the parties in the governing coalition make distinct recommendations as contested votes, Ames has categorized as contested those votes which are most likely the least important to the governing coalition. It is thus not surprising that he finds that leadership recommendations are not significant. A test which codes contested votes based on governing and opposition *coalition* leadership positions could well lead to very different results.

Even if these coding issues do not alter Ames's results, however, they would not preclude the possibility that Brazilian parties act effectively to generate a public record on national policy issues. His conclusion that Brazil is a case of conditional party governance in which influence within parties flows from the bottom up is not incompatible with making programmatic appeals. Whether influence flows from the top down or the bottom up, what we lack is more systematic investigation of party behavior itself, and whether it is consistent with making programmatic appeals to voters.

Scott Mainwaring's (1999) analysis of party discipline examines how parties are structured internally, as well as what tools and incentives are wielded by party leaders. His finding that Brazilian party leaders lack most of the traditional means of disciplining rank and file leads him to the conclusion that:

In Brazil . . . the looseness of party organization has . . . fostered an individualistic pattern of representation in which individual politicians *rather than* parties are the key agents of representation . . .
(Mainwaring, 1999: 138–9, emphasis added)

Mainwaring's first variable limiting leadership power is party-switching. He notes that it is not uncommon for Brazilian deputies to switch parties during a legislative session. He analyzes the change in ideological position of individual legislators as they move between parties in the 49th Congress (1991–94). He suggests that party-switching inhibits discipline, as deputies use their freedom to switch to evade discipline. If this were true, however, we would expect most switching to be from the more highly disciplined parties to the less disciplined parties. The data do not unequivocally support this conclusion. The major parties on the left (PT) and the right (PFL), the two most disciplined of the period, had the fewest number of switchers out of the ideological family, whereas the center party (PMDB), the least disciplined of the period, had the greatest number of defectors to parties with other ideological positions. These data are thus also consistent with the view that deputies find the lack of discipline, and therefore the inability to claim credit with voters for programmatic legislation, to be a liability. At the same time, Ames finds that party-switching is electorally costly (2001: 69–72). Thus, despite the fact that party-switchers are not punished by the leadership, the evidence does not point unequivocally to the conclusion that deputies can ignore national issues and evade discipline with impunity. The evidence presented by Mainwaring and Ames on party-switching is equally consistent with the view that some significant component of voters' choice is driven by national policy preferences, and that voters punish deputies who do not join and stay with parties who represent alternative programs. In other words, the lack of centralized discipline does not necessarily rule out more decentralized forms of discipline.

Mainwaring also points to the high cost of Brazilian elections, and the fact that the party does not provide much financial backing for its candidates, in support of his argument that parties lack significance. In addition, he provides survey data showing that, except for leftist parties, most deputies say their individual efforts are more important than party efforts in securing re-election. Finally, he notes that the extra-congressional party does not exercise strong control over deputy behavior (Mainwaring, 1999: 141). While these findings provide valuable insight into Brazilian party organization, overt party activity in individual campaigns is not a necessary condition in order for the party to determine an important component of

voters' choice. Mainwaring's study shows that in Brazil the individual legislator must expend his own efforts to ensure the personal component of his vote. But this does not preclude party leadership maintenance of the programmatic reputation of the party, which may drive partisan tides in voting (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). It is only if we examine party behavior directly that we can determine whether parties in fact exhibit behavior that could support programmatic appeals.

A final variable limiting leadership control examined by Mainwaring is electoral law. Brazil's electoral rule of open-list proportional representation eliminates rank-ordering on the list as a means of control. With open lists, voters' choices among individual candidates on the list determine which candidates get elected, whereas with closed lists the leadership places candidates in a rank order that determines the order of election. Closed lists clearly empower leaders in comparison to open lists.

Despite all these apparent disadvantages that Brazilian party leaders face, Mainwaring does not consider the possibility that party leaders may have recourse to other tools to ensure the compliance of the rank and file. There is emerging evidence in the literature that party leaders have in fact fashioned other means for disciplining their members. For example, Beatriz (1999) describes the way executive ministers use deputies' voting records in their decisions for releasing funds to the deputies' municipalities.

To summarize, while it is clear that Brazilian parties are decentralized and that legislators devote considerable effort to building their personal reputation, this does not preclude parties organizing to make programmatic appeals. Traditional means of control examined by Mainwaring do not exhaust the possibilities, and party leadership can manage personal vote-seeking activity so that it does not excessively damage a programmatic reputation (Cox and McCubbins, 1993: 123). As Kitschelt puts it: 'The personal vote is the effect of a candidate's personal initiatives on his or her electoral success, *net of aggregate partisan trends* that affect partisans as members of their parties' (2000: 852, emphasis added). It is thus useful to augment this analysis with systematic study of the degree to which individual parties' behavior would allow them to make programmatic appeals. Finally, despite the very important contributions of these scholars, they provide no direct tests of their casual claim that institutions are the key determinant of party behavior. An examination of party behavior from 1945–64 and 1990 to the present can provide such a test.

3. Testing Institutional Theory and Reassessing Brazilian Party Behavior

In this section I test the causal impact of institutions on Brazilian party behavior. I provide several different measures of the degree to which Brazilian party behavior is consistent with making programmatic appeals across

two periods in which institutional rules remained unchanged. I provide traditional measures of unity (the Rice Index) and divisiveness (party votes as a percentage of all roll calls and index of likeness) for government and opposition coalitions in legislative voting. I also provide data on two other aspects of party behavior relevant to making programmatic appeals.

The degree to which parties value a programmatic reputation is reflected in its choice of alliance partners. In multiparty regimes such as Brazil's, parties often ally in order to form a government and appoint a cabinet (Ames, 2001; Amorim Neto, 2002; Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000). If parties seek to differentiate themselves from others according to their policy positions, then cabinet composition would be expected to exhibit a clear government-opposition cleavage. Similarly, parties would typically be expected to form governing alliances with other parties with relatively similar policy positions, and avoid allying with parties espousing contrary ideologies.

A second opportunity to observe programmatic commitments arises from the fact that Brazilian electoral law allows parties to make alliances in proportional representation elections for federal deputy. Parties face ideological constraints in forming these alliances if they wish to maintain a programmatic reputation. Parties should ally with their nearest neighbors along the ideological spectrum more frequently than parties further away if they are concerned about making a programmatic appeal. Preponderance of non-contiguous alliances and patterns of strange bedfellows, i.e. alliances with parties of contrary ideological positions, render appeals on the basis of policy platforms more difficult. In sum, party decisions about when to join a legislative vote, a cabinet or an electoral alliance are all key indicators of a party's commitment to distinctive policy platforms and legislative programs.

Intra-Party Unity and Inter-Party Divisiveness in Legislative Voting

Despite a wealth of important work on Brazilian parties, basic aspects of party behavior remain understudied. Although we have aggregate and yearly data on party unity in legislative voting, we lack information on the behavior of key agents presenting legislative programs in a multiparty regime: government and opposition coalitions. In addition, we have very little information on inter-party divisiveness. As Cooper et al. (1977) argue persuasively, in order to measure the strength of the party as a determinant of voting, we must measure both intra-party unity as well as inter-party divisiveness. This is consistent with what is necessary to make programmatic appeals to voters. Intra-party unity in legislative voting is necessary for demonstrating issue position and for passing a legislative program, whereas inter-party difference in voting is necessary for claiming responsibility for passing certain types of legislation. If all parties vote to pass the same legislation, no particular party will be able to credibly claim they are distinct from the others in securing certain policies.

Tables 3 and 4 provide data on intra-coalition unity (Rice Index) and inter-coalition divisiveness (number of party votes and index of likeness) across the two periods of democracy for all roll-call votes and for all party votes. Following Cooper et al. (1977) and Cox and McCubbins (1993), the level of divisiveness which defines a party vote is that at least 50 percent of one party opposes at least 50 percent of the other party. I adapt the measure to multiparty coalitions by defining a coalition vote as a vote in which at least 50 percent of the members of each of the parties in the governing coalition oppose at least 50 percent of the members of each of the parties in the opposition coalition. I define the government coalition as the parties holding cabinet positions, and the opposition coalition as the largest contiguous coalition to the left or the right of the government coalition.

A crude measure of inter-coalition divisiveness is given by the number of party votes as a percentage of all roll calls. A more fine-grained measure is given by the average index of likeness for all roll calls and for all party votes. The index of likeness is a measure of the degree to which members of two groups (in this case, the government and opposition coalitions) vote the same way on a bill; the higher the index of likeness, the more the members of these two groups vote the same way and the less inter-party divisiveness in legislative voting.³ Thus, whereas party votes simply separate roll calls into two categories based on whether at least 50 percent of the members of each party in the coalition vote the same way, the index of likeness provides an ordinal measure of how many members of each of the parties in the coalition vote together. It is worth noting that this criterion creates a 'hard' test for programmatic behavior. Because the unit of analysis for these measures is a *coalition of parties* in both government and opposition, this is a higher threshold for a party vote and for the index of likeness than if only one government or one opposition party were examined.

As can be seen from the two tables, both intra-coalition unity and inter-coalition divisiveness have risen considerably across the two periods.⁴ The data show that increases in intra-party unity previously documented across all individual parties also holds for both government and opposition coalitions on all roll calls as well as on party votes. The average Rice Index on all roll calls for the government coalition has risen from 69.4 to 82.7 and for the opposition from 65.7 to 92.7. We see a similar shift on party votes for the opposition (from 64.4 to 94.7). And although intra-coalition unity is roughly the same for the government on party votes between the two periods, it must be emphasized that in the earlier period party votes constituted, on average, only 5.1 percent of all roll calls, whereas in the current period party votes constitute 50 percent of all roll calls. Distinct government and opposition coalition voting behavior was minimal in the earlier period, but has clearly emerged since 1989. This is seen in the rise in the number of party votes from 5 to 50 percent as well as in the decrease in the index of likeness across periods. The weighted average index of likeness on all roll calls is nearly twice as high in the earlier period as in the current

Table 3. Roll-call voting in Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, 1946–64¹

<i>Admin. (Cabinet #)</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Gov. coal.</i>	<i>Opp. coal.</i>	<i>Tot. roll calls</i>	<i>Avg. gov. Rice</i>	<i>Avg. opp. Rice</i>	<i>Avg. index of likeness</i>	<i>Pty. vs. (% of roll calls)</i>	<i>Avg. gov. unity</i>	<i>Avg. opp. unity</i>	<i>Avg. index of likeness</i>
DUTRA I Gov. Cab. (1)	1/46–9/46	PSD-PTB	PDC-UDN	5	85.1 (76.2)	80.2 (80.2)	25.4	0	0	0	0
DUTRA II Gov. Cab. (2)	10/46–4/50	PR-PSD-UDN	PTB-PSP	97	67.8 (70.2)	72.8 (61.1)	69.7	2 (2%)	79.8 (82.0)	81.1 (65.0)	26.5
DUTRA III Gov. Cab. (3)	5/50–1/51	PSD-UDN	PTB-PSP-PR	21	83.6 (82.0)	83.9 (83.9)	73.6	0	0	0	0
VARGAS I Gov. Cab. (4)	2/51–5/53	PTB-PSP-PSD-UDN	PR	127	67.1 (66.5)	57.4	85.5	2 (1.5%)	57.7 (56.7)	33.9	54.7
VARGAS II Gov. Cab. (5)	6/53–8/54	PTB-PSD-UDN	PSP-PR	141	56.3 (57.5)	56.7 (56.7)	88.5	1 (0.7%)	48.5 (53.2)	39.8 (50.0)	48.4
CAFÉ FILHO Gov. Cab. (6)	9/54–11/55	PTB-PR-PSD-UDN	PSP	132	60.6 (60.8)	64.3	78.3	2 (1.5%)	38.8 (43.7)	33.3	72.9
RAMOS Gov. Cab. (7)	12/55–1/56	PTB-PSP-PR-PSD	PDC-UDN	8	52.7 (56.1)	79.8 (61.4)	58.9	3 (38%)	80.9 (85.1)	94.9 (90.1)	12.4
JK Gov. Cab. (8)	2/56–1/61	PTB-PSP-PR-PSD	PDC-UDN	306	69.4 (71.2)	75.3 (64.3)	66.7	26 (8.5%)	70.2 (74.5)	83.3 (74.0)	25.7
QUADROS ² Gov. Cab. (9)	2/61–8/61	PTB-PSP-PR-PSD-UDN	PDC	19	63.8 (64.8)	67.4	83.7	0	0	0	0
GOUL. I Gov. Cab. (10)	1/63–6/63	PTB-PSP-PSD	PDC-UDN	5	58.2 (66.9)	56.6 (63.6)	59.3	0	0	0	0
GOUL. II + III Gov. Cab. (11)	7/63–12/63	PTB-PSD-PDC	UDN	8	80.3 (79.1)	49.5	72.4	5	85.7 (83.2)	75.0	20.9
GOUL. IV Total	1/64–3/64	PTB-PSD	PDC-UDN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
				871	65.6 (69.4)	67.9 (65.7)	69.3 (68.1)	41 (5.1%)	70.7 (82.1)	68.5 (64.4)	37.4 (30.0)

LEFT ————— RIGHT³
 PTB – PSP – PR – PSD – PDC – UDN

¹ Roll-call data provided by Octavio Amorim Neto and Fabiano Santos.

² The gap in dates between Quadros and Goulart is due to the institution of a parliamentary regime after the resignation of Quadros. I do not include this period since it was under a different institutional structure. Fifty-six roll calls took place during this period.

³ This placement follows leading analysts of the period such as Santos (1986) and Soares (1973).

Table 4. Roll-call voting in Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, 1990–2002¹

<i>Admin. (Cabinet #)</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Gov. coal.</i>	<i>Opp. coal.</i>	<i>Tot. roll calls</i>	<i>Avg. gov. Rice</i>	<i>Avg. opp. Rice</i>	<i>Avg. index of likeness</i>	<i>Pty. vts. (% of roll calls)</i>	<i>Avg. gov. unity</i>	<i>Avg. opp. unity</i>	<i>Avg. index of likeness</i>
COLLOR I Gov. Cab. (1)	3/90–10/90	PMDB-PRN-PFL ²	PT-PDT-PSDB	25	75.7 (74.0)	87.5 (82.4)	46.5	9 (36%)	74.0 (72.0)	89.8 (87.1)	53.8
COLLOR II Gov. Cab. (2)	11/90–1/92	PRN-PFL-PDS	PT-PDT-PSDB- PMDB	74	76.0 (75.8)	81.3 (78.9)	48.2	11 (15%)	72.0 (71.5)	89.0 (84.1)	37.1
COLLOR III Gov. Cab. (3)	2/92–4/92	PFL-PDS	PT-PDT-PSDB- PMDB	15	80.5 (84.0)	84.7 (85.4)	53.8	6 (40%)	72.8 (78.5)	83.4 (81.5)	20.6
COLLOR IV Gov. Cab. (4)	5/92–9/92	PSDB-PTB-PFL-PDS	PT-PDT	11	85.1 (87.4)	87.6 (88.5)	37.1	2 (18%)	90.3 (91.0)	77.1 (81.4)	14.0
FRANCO I Gov. Cab. (5)	10/92–12/92	PDT-PSDB-PMDB- PTB-PFL	PT	2	87.3 (81.7)	1	16.3	1 (50%)	1	1	2.2
FRANCO II Gov. Cab. (6)	1/93–5/93	PT-PDT-PSDB-PMDB- PTB-PFL	PPB	28	73.0 (72.0)	68.7	62.2	5 (18%)	77.5 (74.1)	55.4	35.9
FRANCO III + IV ³ Gov. Cab. (7)	6/93–12/93	PSDB-PMDB-PTB-PFL	PT-PDT	24	76.5 (78.6)	89.7 (90.1)	41.2	8 (33%)	79.2 (82.9)	92.1 (91.2)	13.8
FRANCO V Gov. Cab. (8)	1/94–12/94	PSDB-PMDB-PFL	PT-PDT	9	73.4 (75.1)	87.9 (89.2)	54.8	2 (22%)	88.0 (89.8)	82.8 (83.9)	14.7
CARDOSO I Gov. Cab. (9)	1/95–3/96	PSDB-PMDB-PTB-PFL	PT-PDT	126	79.6 (79.1)	79.8 (90.1)	43.9	89 (71%)	83.6 (82.6)	89.9 (92.1)	13.9
CARDOSO II Gov. Cab. (10)	4/96–3/99	PSDB-PMDB-PTB- PFL-PPB	PT-PDT	362	78.6 (79.3)	78.3 (94.8)	23.2	259 (72%)	79.9 (80.3)	95.5 (96.8)	12.5
CARDOSO III Gov. Cab. (11)	4/99–2/02	PSDB-PMDB-PFL-PPB	PT-PDT	359	89.6 (90.2)	96.1 (97.7)	53.5	139 (39%)	85.9 (86.5)	96.3 (97.7)	8.1
CARDOSO IV Gov. Cab. (12)	3/02–12/02	PSDB-PMDB-PPB	PT-PDT	31	86.6 (87.6)	95.5 (97.5)	63.9	9 (29%)	86.2 (87.1)	95.7 (97.6)	8.1
Total				1066	80.4 (82.7)	88.6 (92.9)	41.6	540 (51%)	83.0 (80.5)	87.4 (95.1)	13.0

LEFT ————— RIGHT⁴
 PT – PDT – PSDB – PMDB – PTB – PFL – PDS/PPR/PPB

¹ Roll-call data from 1990–98 from Votações nominais na Câmara do Deputados – 1988–1999; Fernando Limongi and Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo, Banco de Dados Legislativos, Cebrap. Data from 1999–2002 from the official website of the Câmara do Deputados at <http://www.camara.gov.br/Internet/plenario/votacao.asp>.

² The PRN was a short-lived party that supported Collor's candidacy in 1989. Data on voting for this party are not available and the PRN was not included in the calculations in Table 4. Due to its ephemeral nature, most analysts do not place it along the spectrum with other parties; most would place it somewhere to the right of the PMDB.

³ I combine Franco III and Franco IV because the major parties in the coalition do not differ.

⁴ This placement follows leading analysts such as Mainwaring (1995) and Limongi and Figueiredo (1995).

period, and on party votes the weighted average in the earlier period is more than three times what it is currently.

A graphic view of these data is provided in Figures 1–4.⁵ In Figure 1, the difference in average unity on roll calls between the two periods is clear in all except the third cabinet (Dutra III and Collor III), a minor one in terms of number of roll calls in both periods.⁶ In Figure 2, the decrease in the index of likeness on roll-call votes and party votes, indicating greater inter-coalition divisiveness across the two periods, is manifest. Finally, Figures 3 and 4 provide a weighting of roll calls based on Carey's (2002) index of closeness. Arguing that party unity will be more important to achieving one's legislative goals on close votes, Carey created an index to weight roll calls based on the closeness of the vote.⁷ As the figures demonstrate, when we weight the vote according to closeness, the increase in party unity across the two periods is greater. For the current period, the weighted Rice Indices track the unweighted indices quite closely for the government coalition, and almost perfectly for the opposition coalition. In the earlier period, however, the weighted indices are considerably lower for both government and opposition for the vast majority of votes.

These data indicate that in the earlier period, parties would have had difficulty differentiating themselves from one another in order to claim credit for a national legislative program. Party votes made up only 5.1 percent of the roll calls, and even with these votes the relatively high index of likeness indicates that government and opposition coalitions did not clearly and consistently square off against one another as blocs. Rather, the data indicate that 'opposition' parties regularly voted with the government, and with the same (low) levels of discipline as government parties. Any claim to




Figure 1. Roll call voting in Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, Rice Indices (weighted averages)




Figure 2. Roll call voting in Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, index of likeness

have been responsible for passing a government program that relied on legislative voting records would confront the problem of low voting unity within the governing parties as well as considerable support from the ‘opposition’ parties. In short, in the period 1945–64, legislative behavior supports the view that Brazilian parties failed to organize around alternative national legislative programs.

In the current period, however, parties in the government can point to consistent records of support for the coalition’s legislative program, and,




Figure 3. Weighted and unweighted Rice Indices roll call votes in Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, 1945–63




Figure 4. Weighted and unweighted Rice Indices roll call voting in Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, 1989–2002

more dramatically, parties in the opposition can point to a voting record that demonstrates consistent opposition to the government. In other words, Brazilian parties' legislative voting records previously provided little information regarding issue position and political responsibility, but now perform that function, comparably, as well as in other presidential systems such as the United States.⁸

Governing Alliances and the Executive Cabinet

An analysis of cabinet composition in Brazil indicates that parties allied with one another in significantly different ways in the two periods of democratic rule. In the 1945–64 period, cabinet alliances did not reliably signal party issue positions. Nor did they distinguish between parties in terms of a clear government–opposition cleavage, and thus they did little to signal political responsibility for specific policies. In contrast, in the period from 1989 to the present, party alliances are good indications of individual party issue position.

Table 5 shows the parties that participated in the cabinets of each administration from 1945 to 1964.

As can be seen from the data, all three of the major parties (PSD, UDN and PTB) participated in the administrations of three of the four elected presidents (Dutra, Vargas and Goulart) as well as in the unelected government of Café Filho. Thus, the parties supporting each of these governments spanned the entire ideological spectrum.

The only exceptions are the Kubitschek administration, the caretaker government of Nereu Ramos and the Goulart administration. Neither

Table 5. Party composition of executive cabinet in Brazil, 1946–64

<i>Admin.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Parties in gov.</i>	<i>Parties in opp.</i>	<i>% Legis. seats</i>	<i>Tot. roll calls</i>
DUTRA I	1/46-9/46	PTB-PSD	PSP, PR, PDC, UDN	60.5	5
DUTRA II	10/46-4/50	PR-PSD-UDN	PTB, PSP, PDC	81.0	97
DUTRA III	5/50-1/51	PSD-UDN	PTB, PSP, PR, PDC	77.7	21
VARGAS I	2/51-5/53	PTB-PSP-PSD- UDN	PR, PDC	88.1	127
VARGAS II	6/53-8/54	PTB-PSD-UDN	PSP, PR, PDC	80.2	141
CAFÉ FILHO	9/54-11/55	PTB-PR-PSD- UDN	PSP, PDC	83.8	132
NEREU RAMOS	12/55-1/56	PTB-PSP-PR- PSD	PDC, UDN	67.8	8
JK	2/56-1/61	PTB-PSP-PR- PSD	PDC, UDN	67.8	306
QUADROS	2/61-8/61	PTB-PSP-PR- PSD-UDN	PDC	89.9	19
GOUL. I	1/63-6/63	PTB-PSP-PSD	PR, PDC, UDN	63.4	5
GOUL. II + III	7/63-12/63	PTB-PSD-PDC	PSP, PR, UDN	57.8	8
GOUL. IV	1/64-3/64	PTB-PSD	PSP, PR, PDC, UDN	57.2	0

Sources: Hippólito, 1985: 58, 293–303; Amorim Neto, 1998.

LEFT _____ RIGHT
 PTB – PSP – PR – PSD – PDC – UDN

Nereu Ramos nor Goulart were elected presidents. Nereu Ramos's term was less than four months, and Goulart's term lasted only two and a half years and accounts for only 13 roll calls. Thus, the Kubitschek administration was the only popularly elected government which served out a full term and passed significant legislation in which there was a consistent ideological differentiation between governing parties and opposition parties based on cabinet composition. During Kubitschek's term the UDN did not participate in the cabinet, but this did not translate into systematic opposition on major legislation, as demonstrated in Table 3, in which only 8.5 percent of the votes were party votes. In all other elected presidents' governments, the only parties that did not participate in the cabinet at some point in time were the PSP and the PDC, which together controlled barely more than 10 percent of the seats in the legislature. The near universal character of these cabinets is reflected in the proportion of legislative seats they controlled. This proportion far surpassed what was necessary to pass legislation, with the average for the period being 72.9 percent of the seats.

These patterns imply that cabinet composition provided very little distinction between the parties in government and the parties in opposition.⁹ With the entire ideological spectrum included in most cabinets, it was impossible for cabinet participation to provide any information that might differentiate parties' issue positions. And with the exception of the Kubitschek administration, no major party could credibly run against the existing government based on consistent refusal to participate in government. When all parties are in the government and no parties are in the opposition, no party can offer a credible alternative to the current administration.

Table 6 indicates the party composition of the executive cabinet from 1990 to 2002.

Table 6. Party composition of executive cabinet in Brazil, 1990–2002

<i>Admin.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Gov. coal.</i>	<i>Opp. coal.</i>	<i>% Legis. seats</i>	<i>Tot. roll calls</i>
COLLOR I	3/90-10/90	PMDB-PRN-PFL	PT-PDT-PSDB	77.6	24
COLLOR II	11/90-1/92	PRN-PFL-PDS	PT-PDT-PSDB-PMDB	32.8	74
COLLOR III	2/92-4/92	PFL-PDS	PT-PDT-PSDB-PMDB	24.8	15
COLLOR IV	5/92-9/92	PSDB-PTB-PFL-PDS	PT-PDT	40.0	11
FRANCO I	10/92-12/92	PDT-PSDB-PMDB-PTB-PFL	PT	62.3	2
FRANCO II	1/93-5/93	PT-PDT-PSDB-PMDB-PTB-PFL	PPB	69.3	28
FRANCO III + IV ¹	6/93-12/93	PSDB-PMDB-PTB-PFL	PT-PDT	53.2	24
FRANCO V	1/94-12/94	PSDB-PMDB-PFL	PT-PDT	45.6	9
CARDOSO I	1/95-3/96	PSDB-PMDB-PTB-PFL	PT-PDT	56.3	126
CARDOSO II	4/96-3/99	PSDB-PMDB-PTB-PFL-PPB	PT-PDT	66.4	362
CARDOSO III	4/99-3/02	PSDB-PMDB-PFL-PPB	PT-PDT	67.7	359
CARDOSO IV	4/02-6/02	PSDB-PMDB-PPB	PT-PDT	47.0	31

Sources: Amorim Neto, 2002 (data from 1990–98); personal communication, Amorim Neto (data from 1999–2002).

LEFT ————— RIGHT²
 PT – PDT – PSDB – PMDB – PTB – PFL – PDS/PPR/PPB

1. I combine Franco III and Franco IV because the major parties in the coalition do not differ.
2. The PRN was a short-lived party that supported Collor's candidacy in 1989. Its ephemeral nature results in the fact that most analysts do not place it in the spectrum with other parties but would probably place it to the right of the PMDB.

The participation of all major parties in most administrations seen in the earlier period is no longer evident in the current period. The only administration which exhibits the kind of shifting coalitions encompassing the entire ideological spectrum is Itamar Franco, an unelected president who served out the last two years of Collor's term after his impeachment. In every other administration, governing alliances unmistakably separate parties into government and opposition camps and provide clear indications of political responsibility. Collor relied on rightist cabinets, while the two Cardoso administrations were made up of center-right coalitions. Moreover, the number of seats controlled in the legislature is also reduced: the average proportion of legislative seats controlled by a governing coalition is 53.6 percent. Given that much of the legislation of the current period took the form of constitutional amendments which require two rounds of voting and a three-fifths (60 percent) majority for approval in both houses, this reduction in the proportion of seats controlled gains even more significance. Although the incentive for the executive to form larger coalitions has increased with the supermajority required to pass much major legislation, the average number of seats controlled has decreased. These patterns of cabinet formation clearly distinguish which parties should be held responsible for the policies and legislation of a particular administration. A party's membership in the governing coalition or its place in the opposition provides information regarding the party's support for particular policies.

Given the emphasis on particularism in the literature on Brazilian parties, a word about the role of cabinets in determining the distribution of particularistic goods is in order. A certain portion of the federal transfer of funds to municipalities in Brazil takes place through agreements between ministers and legislators or parties in the governing coalition. Decision-making authority about which municipalities will receive these funds is one of the key discretionary powers held by government ministers. The conclusion many have drawn from this is that cabinet composition has little to do with programs and everything to do with the distribution of an all-pervasive particularism (Ames, 2001: 185–6).

As discussed above, the distribution of these particularistic goods need not eliminate attention to partisan national policy goals. The existence of these distributions does not rule out ministerial appointments as indicators not only of which parties will have the president's ear in these distributions, but also of which parties will help shape the national policy program (Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000). The examination of legislative voting above provides support for this view. The increase in intra-coalition Unity in the governing coalition across the two periods seen in Figures 3 and 4 indicates that in the current period participation in the cabinet carries with it the obligation to support the government's legislative program. This is consistent with the view that ministerial portfolios distributed to parties are not simply conduits to resources – they are part of a complex bargain that includes both a policy program and perks for the party faithful.

Electoral Alliances in Elections for Federal Deputy

Brazil's institutional rules provide an additional indicator of the degree to which parties emphasize programs. Electoral law in Brazil allows parties to make alliances in proportional representation elections for federal deputy, and votes are pooled across all parties in the alliance. The degree to which parties align with ideologically similar parties provides an indicator of the importance of programmatic appeals.

Table 7 indicates the frequency with which different parties formed electoral coalitions in elections for federal deputy between 1950 and 1962.¹⁰ Parties are placed along the top row from left to right according to how leading scholars of the period evaluated their relative stances on major issues.

The first entry in each cell indicates the number of alliances made between the two parties throughout the period. The number in parentheses provides a relative measure of the degree to which the party favors or disfavors its nearest ideological neighbor over other parties in making alliances. This number is calculated by dividing the number of alliances made with the given party by the number made with its nearest ideological neighbor with which it allies most frequently. Thus, for example, the PTB, reading across the row, makes alliances with the PR 0.7 times as often as with the PSP, its nearest ideological neighbor. The shaded square in each row identifies the most frequent alliance partner for that party.

If electoral alliance behavior were to provide coherent information regarding issue position, parties should be aligned most often with their nearest neighbors along the issue spectrum. In this case, the shaded cells would be adjacent to the blacked-out diagonal. In addition, if ideological consistency is important, we would expect that the numbers in parentheses would decrease as one reads along the row on each side of the blacked-out cell toward the ends of the table. This would indicate that alliances decreased monotonically as distance along the ideological spectrum increased. As can be seen from the table, however, the first criterion holds only for the PDC and the PR, two small parties that together never attained more than 7.3

Table 7. Electoral alliances: federal legislative elections for the Chamber of Deputies, Brazil, 1950–62

	<i>PTB</i>	<i>PSP</i>	<i>PR</i>	<i>PSD</i>	<i>PDC</i>	<i>UDN</i>
<i>PTB</i>		10	7 (0.7)	14 (1.4)	3 (0.3)	9 (0.9)
<i>PSP</i>	10 (0.8)		13	11 (0.8)	8 (0.6)	17 (1.3)
<i>PR</i>	7 (0.5)	13		8 (0.6)	7 (0.9)	12 (1.5)
<i>PSD</i>	14 (1.8)	11 (1.4)	8 (0.9)		9	9 (1)
<i>PDC</i>	3 (0.3)	8 (0.9)	7 (0.8)	9 (0.8)		11
<i>UDN</i>	9 (0.8)	17 (1.5)	12 (1.0)	9 (0.8)	11	

Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Dados Estatísticos, vols 2–5.

percent of the seats in the legislature. No party meets the second criterion – in all cases parties ally with greater frequency with those further away than with their nearest neighbor. In one case, the PSD, the largest party throughout the period, we see a monotonic trend of increasing alliances as ideological distance increases! Finally, we can see that there is no important difference in the number of alliances each party forms with its nearest neighbors and those on its furthest extremes – the numbers in parentheses at both ends of each row, once again with the exception of the PDC and the PR, are all close to 1.¹¹

As the table indicates, in this earlier democratic period all parties ally with all other parties with roughly the same frequency. Therefore, parties' electoral alliance behavior fails to provide any information that could indicate support for distinct policy programs. The importance of alliances in informing the party's public record is demonstrated by the fact that alliances increased in each successive election, forming 40 percent of all tickets in 1950 and rising to 60 percent of all tickets in 1962 (Lima, Jr., 1980: 73).

Table 8 indicates that electoral alliance behavior in the current period is substantially different from that of the earlier period. As above, the parties are aligned from left to right as leading scholars characterize their major positions on issues. The entries in Table 8 are derived in the same way as those in Table 7.

Table 8 clearly shows the pattern that would be expected if parties were concerned about creating a public record of support for a distinct policy program: parties ally with their nearest neighbors along the spectrum most frequently. This is shown by the fact that all the shaded cells are adjacent to the blacked-out diagonal for every row. With the exception of the PFL, which allies with essentially the same frequency with the PMDB and the PSDB, the number of alliances now decreases monotonically with distance between the parties along the spectrum. Distance between parties along the ideological spectrum is now a good predictor of whether two parties will form an electoral alliance.¹² The pattern of strange bedfellow alliances

Table 8. Electoral alliances: federal legislative elections for the Chamber of Deputies, Brazil, 1986–2002

	<i>PT</i>	<i>PDT</i>	<i>PSDB</i>	<i>PMDB</i>	<i>PFL</i>	<i>PDS/PPR/PPB</i>
<i>PT</i>		21	7 (0.3)	1 (0.05)	0	0
<i>PDT</i>	21 (0.9)		23	14 (0.6)	13 (0.6)	12 (0.5)
<i>PSDB</i>	7 (0.2)	23 (0.6)		38	31 (0.8)	24 (0.6)
<i>PMDB</i>	1 (0.03)	25 (0.7)	38		29 (0.8)	26 (0.7)
<i>PFL</i>	0	13 (0.2)	31 (0.5)	29 (0.5)		56
<i>PDS/PPR/PPB</i>	0	12 (0.2)	24 (0.4)	26 (0.5)	56	

Source: Schmitt, 1999; <http://www.tse.gov.br>

which characterized the earlier period has been replaced by a consistent pattern of programmatically coherent alliances in the current period. Thus, electoral alliance behavior in the current period does provide information that distinguishes between the parties' issue positions.

Conclusions

An examination of legislative voting, governing coalitions and electoral coalitions in Brazil from 1945 to 1964 and 1989 to 2002 demonstrates that the behavior of Brazilian parties has changed considerably. The patterns of behavior in the period from 1945 to 1964 provided very little information that could inform a party program. In the period since 1989, however, Brazilian parties have clearly begun to behave in ways that allow them to distinguish themselves from one another in their public records of support for distinctive policy platforms and legislative programs. The purported failure of Brazilian parties to aggregate interests around broad policy platforms has often been attributed to the electoral law (Ames, 1995a, b, 2001; Geddes, 1994; Geddes and Ribeiro Neto, 1992; Mainwaring, 1999; Shugart and Carey, 1992). However, electoral law remains constant between the two periods of democracy in Brazil, while party behavior undergoes a significant transformation.

These data also allow us to rule out an alternative institutional explanation for the changes in party behavior in Brazil in the current period. Figueiredo and Limongi (1998, 2000) have argued that the executive's increased agenda-setting powers explain the increase in discipline in legislative voting. Certainly, such powers have facilitated the formation of legislative majorities, but this argument cannot explain the changes in electoral alliance behavior, which are quite striking. Finally, the data contradict the view that changes in party behavior are simply an artefact of the emergence of one highly disciplined party, the PT. As the data show, the changes are evident across the ideological spectrum.

If electoral law, executive agenda-setting powers and the emergence of the PT are insufficient to explain these data, then what has brought about this change in Brazilian party behavior? The findings point to the need for more precise analytic distinctions between different types of links to voters, and for theories to explain why parties choose one kind of link over the other. Many of the analysts discussed above mention the role of clientelism, but fail to distinguish this type of direct link to voters from classic particularism, which is indirect, and distinct, from clientelism.¹³ Intra-party discipline and inter-party divisiveness are not necessary for claiming credit for goods delivered directly to voters in a *quid pro quo* clientelist exchange. Thus, in a clientelist system, the kind of party behavior seen in Brazil from 1945 to 1964 need not create credit-claiming problems for legislators. If there is any national policy component to voter choice, however, intra-party discipline

and inter-party divisiveness *are* crucial to surmounting the credit-claiming problems associated with the indirect delivery of national collective goods, *even when electoral law promotes individualistic behavior*. Personalist electoral law will lead individual politicians to buck the party line more often and focus on developing a personal reputation. But if politicians are to claim credit for *any* collective goods, a moderate degree of intra-party discipline and inter-party divisiveness is necessary in order for voters to identify an agent responsible for passing such legislation. Thus, if there is any national policy component to voter choice, legislators will seek to join parties that communicate national policy positions to voters, even in the presence of considerable particularism.

In sum, the data suggest that parties' incentive to organize around programs is powerfully influenced by other variables in addition to electoral law. Further study of the transformation from direct clientelist exchange to the indirect delivery of particularistic/programmatic goods appears promising in the quest for a fully general theory of party behavior. While it is beyond the scope of this article, investigation of whether and why politicians are abandoning clientelist, *quid pro quo*, links to voters for more indirect links through local and national collective goods is a promising approach to explaining these changes in party behavior.

Notes

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- 1 On the period 1945–64, see Amorim Neto and Santos (2001). For the current period, see Limongi and Figueiredo (1995) and Figueiredo and Limongi (2000).
- 2 The index of likeness measures the degree to which members of two parties or blocs vote together. It is obtained by calculating the percentage of members from two separate parties or blocs that vote in the same direction and subtracting the difference from 100.
- 3 The index of likeness is obtained by calculating the percentage of members from two separate parties or blocs that vote in the same direction and subtracting the difference from 100.
- 4 All numbers in parentheses in Tables 3 and 4 are weighted averages. Each individual party's Rice Index or index of likeness is weighted by the party's weight in the coalition, and thus these figures give a more accurate measure of discipline or likeness of the coalition.
- 5 All figures constructed using the weighted averages across the coalition. Figures 3 and 4 take the weighted averages across the coalition and weight them based on closeness of the vote.

- 6 The difference in unity across the two periods is similar on party votes. Please contact the author for copies of the figure.
- 7 This index is calculated as $WRice_i = \sum RICE_{ij} * CLOSE_j / \sum CLOSE_j$ where $CLOSE_j = 1 - (1 / THRESHOLD * THRESHOLD - \%Aye_j)$ for all votes j for party i .
- 8 For data on the US House of Representatives from 1889–1969, see Cooper et al. (1977). For data through the late 1980s, see Rohde (1990). See also Carey (2002) for more recent data on all democracies with roll-call data.
- 9 Some observers might object that the UDN strongly opposed Vargas, and thus an opposition did exist in the period from 1945 to 1964. I have no argument with the view that the UDN wanted desperately to eliminate *the person* of Vargas from the political scene. What is significant is that despite this stance, the UDN allied in elections with Vargas's two protégé parties, the PTB and the PSD (see the following section), the UDN participated in Vargas's cabinet in one of the three most important ministries of the period, the Ministry of Agriculture, and, most importantly, majorities of the party consistently voted to pass the most important statist legislation of Vargas's administration. Moreover, all of this behavior had the approval of the UDN leadership (Benevides, 1981; Hippólito, 1985). Thus, although the UDN displayed a strong personalist antipathy to Vargas, what they did not display was any kind of consistent *party* opposition to his governments or his policies. Since the argument here is about parties advertising and claiming credit for programs, as opposed to serving as personalist vehicles, whether pro or anti certain individuals, this anti-Vargas UDN behavior does not invalidate the argument.
- 10 Electoral coalitions were not allowed in the 1945 elections. Tables 7 and 8 include all registered electoral alliances for all legislative elections for the respective period.
- 11 Mainwaring (1995) uses an alternative placement along the spectrum from left to right of PTB-PSP-PSD-PDC-UDN-PR. This placement does not change the findings. In fact, with this placement, only the PDC allies most often with its nearest ideological neighbor, whereas with the placement used here, both the PDC and the PR, two of the smaller parties, make the largest number of alliances with their closest ideological neighbor.
- 12 Samuels (2000) has argued that state-level conflicts determine who will form electoral alliances, without regard to national partisan platforms. Ames (2001: 68, 76), too, suggests that state-level deals and conflicts are central to determining party alliance behavior. Yet, while *specific* alliances across states differ in any given election, the data presented here indicate that the vast majority of those differences represent alliances with one of the two available ideological neighbors (there are two for most parties), rather than with strange bedfellows. This pattern holds across elections, indicating that, even if local conflicts determine specific alliance partners in a given state and election, ideological considerations constrain the range of permissible partners across states and elections. Parties need not form alliances with exactly the same partners in each election or in each state in order to provide consistent information about their positions. Rather, they need only consistently ally with the parties with the most alike stances on the issues.
- 13 For discussions of clientelism that are not clearly distinguished from particularism, see Amorim Neto and Santos (2001), Ames (2001), Mainwaring (1999), Geddes (1994). For the seminal work on particularism as locally targeted public goods, see Ferejohn (1974). On the distinction between particularism and clientelism, see Kitschelt (2000).

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