Minimum Winning Electoral Coalitions Under Presidentialism: Reality or Fiction? The Case of Brazil

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ABSTRACT

This article studies the motivations of party leaders to form “minimum winning” electoral coalitions—alliances that cease to be winning if one member is subtracted. In Brazil, concurrent elections stimulate political actors’ coordination, and electoral alliances are allowed. In 2002 and 2006, moreover, the Electoral Supreme Court obliged those parties with presidential candidates to replicate this electoral arrangement in the district. Under “verticalization,” parties with presidential candidates could not form alliances with rival parties in the concurrent legislative and gubernatorial elections. Verticalization arguably pushed party leaders to form minimum winning electoral coalitions. This new rule forced them to reconsider the contributions of each possible ally in the elections for president, federal deputy, and governor. Examining the elections from 1998 to 2006, this study finds that under verticalization, while parties did form more electoral coalitions with those partners they considered crucial to win, they did so at the expense of policy.

Ordinary theories of coalitions are often applied to the study of government formation under parliamentarism, the only level of analysis being the legislature. In the electoral context under presidentialism, however, such analysis needs to be adapted to reflect the interactions between executive and congressional candidates. The incentives at various levels are not the same, and any proposed theoretical framework should allow for this variation.

This article studies the motivations party leaders have, under presidentialism, to form “minimum winning” electoral coalitions—alliances that cease to be winning if one member is subtracted (Riker 1962). Under what conditions do they form? What kinds of parties do they comprise? Do coalitions for president interfere with those for Congress? Brazil is an excellent case study because concurrent elections stimulate political actors’ strategic coordination (Samuels 2000a, b, 2003; Power and Mochel 2008) and electoral alliances are allowed. In this context, coalition theory needs to be explored thoroughly, enclosing the races for president (national level), federal deputy (federal district level), and governor (district level); therefore, a three-level game.
In 2002 and 2006, moreover, Brazil’s Electoral Supreme Court (TSE) obliged those parties with presidential candidates to replicate the presidential electoral arrangement in the district. Under this judicial decision, known as verticalization, parties with presidential candidates could not form alliances with rival parties in the concurrent legislative and gubernatorial elections. This study argues that verticalization pushed party leaders to form minimum winning electoral coalitions. They faced a strategic dilemma: whether to run a presidential candidate, having to replicate the electoral agreement, or to abstain from the presidential race, thus remaining free to decide on the parties with which they would form alliances in the district. This new rule forced national party bosses to reconsider the potential contributions of each possible ally (as well as the concessions involved) in the elections for president, federal deputy, and governor (Sousa 2006; Fleischer 2007).

This article poses a challenge to theorization and testing of minimum winning electoral coalitions in systems with “nested elections” (Tsebelis 1990). In the parliamentary environment, this study anticipates that parties ally to maximize votes while minimizing office or policy concessions. Otherwise, the governing coalition may not be able to enact its proposals. In presidential systems like Brazil, where the totality of congressional seats is shared among the districts, the assumption that district party bosses form alliances with goals similar to those of national legislators in Europe still holds. Brazilian politicians form coalitions for Congress to maximize their party’s representation, boosting either their bargaining power with the elected president or their chances of joining the governing coalition. To do so, candidates for federal deputy may also count on a gubernatorial candidate’s votes, in such a way that alliances at these two levels entail an agreement between them in terms of electoral payoffs (Lavareda 1991; Nicolau 1996). In short, this study argues that the resemblance in partisan goals under parliamentarism and presidentialism allows for the use of government coalition formation models to predict which electoral coalition will form, before and after the decision to make alliances vertical in Brazil.

In addition to Riker’s insights, this research relies on the work of De Swaan (1973) and Axelrod (1970, 1997). These authors contend that political actors tend to form minimum winning coalitions, at the same time trying to avoid problems that could emerge if ideologically distant partners were accepted. Altogether, this study examines the 1998 elections (before verticalization); and, with respect to 2002 and 2006, under verticalization, it identifies differences in electoral coalition formation. The findings point in one direction: the judicial electoral engineering produced unanticipated effects. While parties indeed formed more electoral coalitions with those partners they considered crucial to win, they
did so at the expense of policy. After verticalization, these electoral alliances also resulted in more ideologically diverse policies.

After exploring the insights of Riker and his followers, this article looks at electoral coalition formation in Brazil and verticalization. The underlying assumption is that coalition theory travels, albeit with some adaptations, to the electoral context under presidentialism. This assumption is tested and the results analyzed in terms of the implications for what is known about electoral alliances.

**Minimum Winning Coalitions: The Theory**

Several scholars have offered predictions for which kinds of (governing) coalitions will form in parliamentary systems. Riker (1962), the very first to propose a formal theory of coalitions that could be used to study politics, advances three propositions: the size principle ("minimum winning size"), the strategic principle (the move toward the minimum winning size), and the disequilibrium principle (the selective elimination of participants). The general idea is that with complete and perfect information, winning alliances tend to be minimum-sized.

The effort toward achieving this minimum winning size follows a calculation: since the gains are supposed to be divided among all parties in the coalition, adding too many partners is irrational. If, as Gamson puts it, "any participant will expect others to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources which they contribute to a coalition" (1961, 376), the incentive to eliminate an alliance member will always be present.

Although Riker's propositions are clear-cut, they do not explain everything. Specifically, Riker does not examine the role of ideology in the formation of alliances. Also, it is possible for the outcome to be different from the minimum winning expectation because participants do not possess accurate information as to when the coalition reaches its minimum size. "Even though the members of a winning coalition know they have formed it, they keep on adding members until they have reached some specific size larger than the minimum" (Riker 1962, 43). The perception of minimum winning coalitions turns into "subjectively estimated ones."

Indeed, De Swaan (1973) recognizes that in the real world, parties tend to form "oversized winning coalitions." Nevertheless, "actors strive to join coalitions of minimal ideological diversity, rather than to maximize payoffs" (1973, 74). These "closed" ideological alliances—as De Swaan names them—would prevail because "the members of the smaller coalition will prefer to form it, since negotiations and bargaining are easier to complete, and a coalition is easier to hold tighter, other things equal, with fewer parties" (Leiserson 1970, 90).
Similar to De Swaan, Axelrod (1970, 1997) contends that "connected" coalitions—those whose parties are adjacent on the left-right spectrum—would predominate because, although adding members translates into more resources, sharing the alliance’s payoffs with rival parties is suboptimal. Thus, inherent in Axelrod’s framework is the assumption that coalition makers attempt to maximize their benefits by minimizing the adversaries’ possibilities of victory.

With these insights in mind, Franklin and Mackie (1984) replicated the findings of scholars dedicated to the study of governing coalitions in parliamentary democracies, concluding that "the additive combination of ideology plus size performs considerably better than either of its components alone" (684). Concentrating on the influence of policy, Laver and Budge (1992) confirm that it plays a role in the formation of European coalition governments, although no single model fits all political systems. Politicians in "Ireland, Germany, and Italy tend to pursue office for its own sake . . . [while] policy seems to predominate over office as a motivation in most other countries" (413).

On the whole, in parliamentary systems, one would expect minimum winning (governing) coalitions among parties that occupy a segment of the policy scale. To verify this in the electoral context under presidentialism, though, more than one level of analysis needs to be considered, as attempts to maximize ballots—while minimizing office or policy concessions—involve political players at the national and subnational levels. Brazil is an excellent case to test these propositions because alliances are allowed at all levels. To offer such a model, it is useful to look at the Brazilian political institutions and how they interact, building toward a logic of electoral coalition formation.

**Electoral Coalition Formation in Brazil**

Concurrent elections, along with some features of the electoral legislation, boost political actors’ coordination (Shugart 1995; Jones 1997a, b; Samuels 2000a, b, 2003; Power and Mochel 2008). In this vein, we can see that coalitions for federal deputy and governor in Brazil are intertwined. On the one hand, in the proportional race for Congress, small party labels often enter alliances to maximize winning results (Schmitt 1999; Braga 2006). On the other hand, in the concurrent majoritarian race for governor, larger parties (the ones that typically run candidates) may help smaller party labels make it to the Federal Chamber of Deputies if these small parties support the gubernatorial campaign. Small parties can be valuable to the coalition: owing to the electoral law that will be reviewed, they add relevant assets, especially to the gubernatorial race (Lavareda 1991; Nicolau 1996).
While this might indicate that politicians have incentives to include alliance members ad infinitum, this article contends that those parties with gubernatorial candidates are pushed to estimate the payoffs inherent in expanding their electoral partners, since this means that they are also going to have more competitors within the concurrent proportional electoral coalition. This size constraint is similar to that which legislators face under parliamentarism, the birthplace of minimum winning theory. In presidential systems, electoral parties maximize seats and minimize concessions so that they are taken into consideration by the president afterward (either in the formation of the cabinet or in the distribution of pork). In parliamentary systems, as the executive and the legislature form one single body, maximizing power means holding as many cabinet positions as possible. "To enter the cabinet, a minority party will have to team up with one or more other parties, but it will resist the inclusion of unnecessary parties in the coalition because this would reduce its share of ministers in the cabinet" (Lijphart 1984, 48).

In Brazil, arguably, the minimum winning ceiling is even more powerful under verticalization. The judicial ruling changed parties' calculations by stimulating political elites to be more aggressive about forming electoral coalitions that could potentially deliver winning results. Under verticalization, as a given alliance's payoffs would be shared not only in the district but also in the presidential competition, we can expect politicians to have been ultracautious about accepting electoral coalition members.

It will be also hypothesized that verticalization pushed party bosses to form minimum winning, ideologically homogeneous electoral coalitions. As Axelrod (1970, 1997) and De Swaan (1973) explain, negotiations are easier to complete if the parties in the alliance are similar. Since party leaders were induced to reach more complex electoral agreements after verticalization, we would expect those minimum winning electoral coalitions with ideologically similar parties to proliferate.

Entangled Electoral Coalition Bargaining in the District

Studying the effects of both concurrent elections and the electoral rule on the effective number of legislative parties across 12 democracies (including Brazil), Shugart (1995) concludes that concurrent elections and localizing rules reduce the number of parties to two.\(^5\) This would give "legislative candidates the advantages of being allied with a major presidential contender, but also the electoral independence to tailor their message and behavior to suit the needs of local constituents" (335). Building on Shugart, Jones (1997a, b) uses data from Argentina to argue that multipartism in the legislature is determined by the degree of tem-
poral concurrence between the gubernatorial and congressional elections. Where political power is decentralized, such as in Argentina and Brazil, subnational elections may influence the results for Congress.

In relation to Brazil, Samuels (2000a, b, 2003) puts together Shugart's and Jones's insights to examine the 1994 and 1998 elections for president, federal deputy, and governor. He hypothesizes that concurrent elections enhance coordination, depressing the number of party lists running for Congress. Samuels reports statistically significant presidential and gubernatorial coattails, although gubernatorial ones predominate. Samuels offers two generalizations. First, since proportional candidates rely on district-based party machines to win elections while forming congruent alliances with those for governor, gubernatorial races overshadow links between the president and Congress. Second, as electoral coalitions are hardly congruent across districts and often do not last after Election Day, federal deputies would not focus on national politics. Ultimately, facing loose party discipline and federalism, the president would struggle to govern.

Although Brambor et al. (2006) have dismissed Samuels's gubernatorial coattails, electoral institutions do have a propensity to generate strategic choices for political elites, along the lines of research on electoral engineering and coordination. For the purpose of this article, it is enough to acknowledge that Samuels emphasizes that concurrent elections have made coordination easier (in the form of congruent alliances in the district), regardless of the results of this maneuver. Candidates for federal deputy and governor tend to associate with each other because they think it is more advantageous to do so, as opposed to allying with the presidential candidate (at least, before verticalization).

On the one hand, the party label with candidates for federal deputy may count on the support of the gubernatorial candidate's (large) party—in a concurrent proportional electoral coalition. As Brazil uses the open list to elect federal deputies, this is very attractive to smaller parties: they can take advantage of vote pooling. Brazilian congressional candidates run against hundreds of competitors, and uncertainty regarding outcomes is high. Thus, parties and candidates need to maximize votes to attain seats (Mainwaring 1999). Also, since the electoral quotient is relatively higher in small district magnitudes, parties in general concentrate efforts to elect federal deputies. In this context, other (large) parties' help, in an alliance, is valuable (Schmitt 1999; Braga 2006).

On the other hand, due to the electoral legislation, larger coalitions mean more free media exposure for the district executive office campaign. Unlike the proportional race, in which "the hundreds of congressional candidates get only a few seconds" (Ames 2001, 43), a gubernatorial candidate will not divide the alliance's TV and radio time with any other name. In addition, those (small) parties with proportional
candidates can provide human resources to the gubernatorial campaign to get out the vote, and vice versa. In sum, politicians bargain so that alliances at these two concurrent levels share an agreement in terms of electoral payoffs (Lavareda 1991; Nicolau 1996). Samuels did not spell it out, but this is precisely why they usually contain the same parties.

This is not to affirm that parties do not consider the presidential election when forming their alliances. Commenting on electoral coalitions before verticalization, Power and Mochel (2008) agree that concurrent elections have “forced major parties to coordinate their alliance formation with greater care” (223). But the fact is that coalitions at the subnational level are more viable. Brazil has 27 electoral districts, and roughly 30 parties regularly run for the Federal Chamber of Deputies in alliances (Sousa 2006). Thus, coordinating electoral spoils to win in each district gets more complicated when one more player is added: the presidential electoral party. Also, as Abrucio (1998) points out, after the return to democracy in 1986, the first gubernatorial contest (1986) happened before the first presidential election (1989). That is, the incentives for electoral coalition building (free media time and vote pooling, mainly) originated in the district.

Now, while it might seem that Brazilian party bosses indefinitely add electoral coalition members to maximize winning results, it can be argued that the open-list PR system itself—reinforced in that concurrent elections facilitate coordination—mitigates this tendency. Specifically, those parties in the alliance that expect to more easily attain the quotient in the proportional race (the largest parties, which also nominate gubernatorial candidates) push for fewer coalition participants. After all, with the open list, the larger this number is, the likelier that the vote will get spread toward other parties and candidates in the alliance. “The trade-off will be felt in the legislative elections; by running in the legislative election on a coalition list of candidates, the large parties, while giving space to the small partners in the coalition, reduce their chances of gaining a larger number of seats in the legislative house” (Kinzo 2003, 58). Simultaneously, in the race for governor, the larger the coalition is, the more free media time it has. But parties with gubernatorial candidates do not want unnecessary alliance members in the proportional competition, for the reasons just mentioned.

Without a doubt, it is difficult to understand a game by looking at only one level of analysis; frequently, decisions are “nested” (Tsebelis 1990). If political actors in Brazil seem not to be choosing an optimal strategy, in reality, they are involved in a larger game. The payoffs in one electoral arena often relate to those in another. So larger parties with gubernatorial candidates may accept probable losses in a proportional alliance. They do this in exchange for gains in the district majoritarian coalition. Similarly, smaller parties may give up on running their
own candidates for governor and enter a large party’s coalition. That way, they will count on extra ballots to elect representatives in the proportional electoral coalition. In short, the distribution of electoral spoils is paramount, because the gains are divided not only within the alliances but between them (the coalitions for federal deputy and governor). District party leaders dose the number of electoral partners so that it is the minimum necessary in terms of electoral contributions and concessions—in these two races, altogether—in order to win.

Turning to Samuels’s second generalization, that electoral coalition formation entails different members across Brazil, new research stresses that the process is not cumbersome. From 1990 to 2002, ideological distance is a good predictor of whether two parties will enter an electoral alliance (Lyne 2005), a sign they are concerned about the party’s reputation (Lyne 2004). Political elites feel reticent about forming pre-election alliances with strange bedfellows because voters are an immediate constraint on politicians’ actions (Golder 2006). Hence, contrary to what Samuels implies, there is reason to expect that (minimum winning) electoral coalitions in Brazil contain similar participants, along the lines of De Swaan (1973) and Axelrod (1970, 1997).

Moreover, contrary to Samuels, in the legislative arena, given that the presidency is strong, Brazilian presidents use their agenda-setting powers to foster the desires of parties to build (near) majority governing coalitions and approve legislation (Limongi and Figueiredo 2000, 2006). The executive also has the power of the purse to co-opt individual politicians, if necessary (Raile et al. 2006). That is, while candidates for federal deputy and governor do have electoral incentives to rally around each other in alliances to win (as Samuels claims), legislators need to be loyal not to the elected governor but to the president (contrary to what Samuels argues). All in all, cooperating with the central government assures money, as the president favors his or her allies when authorizing the execution of the national budget (Vaz 2001). These resources are important: they can be applied to constituency work (Santos 2002) and promote name recognition and re-election.

In this sense, even though federalism may introduce an additional element of organized uncertainty, giving voice to subnational units in national politics (Abrucio and Samuels 2000), in Congress, the Brazilian president has the power to work as a neutralizer. Putting it differently, the assumption in this study—that a resemblance in partisan goals allows us to use government coalition formation models to predict electoral coalition building—holds. The calculations of the players in presidential regimes with federal legislative elections are to minimize electoral costs while maximizing representation. In parliametarism, more legislative seats, with fewer partners to divide the payoffs, are equivalent to taking control of government. In presidentialism, more legislative seats, which
result from an electoral calculation entailing those allies crucial to win, mean strength that the president must take into account afterward.

Bearing in mind that the set of electoral rules in Brazil motivates political actors to minimize the number of electoral coalition members while at the same time maximizing the chances of electing representatives, we can expect alliances that conform to Riker's minimum winning principles. In addition, they should be made of parties that value policy, as suggested by Riker's followers. Now, under verticalization, has electoral coalition building changed? Verticalization provides an interesting opportunity to analyze political behavior in the context of a three-level competition, as it formally links the elections for president with those for Congress and governor. The advent of verticalization arguably pushed parties to reevaluate their electoral spoils and be (more) prudent in terms of alliance partners. After all, running a presidential candidate meant that this electoral arrangement would have to be replicated in scale.

**ELECTORAL COALITION BUILDING UNDER VERTICALIZATION**

In 2002 and 2006, the Electoral Supreme Court (TSE) enforced "vertically compatible" electoral coalitions, from the highest level (presidency) to the district. That is, any party that planned to run a presidential candidate would no longer be allowed to form alliances with rival parties in the concurrent legislative and gubernatorial elections.

Specifically, party leaders had in mind two scenarios: if my party or coalition does not have a presidential candidate, it is electorally unrestrained in the district; and if my party or coalition has a presidential candidate, then it must replicate this electoral arrangement downward (if desired, adding in the district those parties that abstained from the presidential race). Forcing party bosses to think in terms of national versus district payoffs, "verticalization" imposed on politicians the need to reconsider the advantages and disadvantages that competing for president could present, mainly in the district (Sousa 2006; Fleischer 2007). In relation to the presidential election, under verticalization, the scenario was very different from 1998.

In 2002, two candidates had real chances of winning: the PT (Workers' Party), which kept one of its allies from the previous election, the PC do B (Communist Party), and increased its number of partners by one; and the PSDB (center-right), which kept one partner, the PMDB (the main centrist party) but lost all its other allies. Two parties that had joined the PSDB presidential coalition in 1998 (PFL and PPB, both right-wing) abstained from the presidential competition in 2002. Seven tiny party labels (PV, PT do B, PSDC, PRONA, PTN, PSC, and PSN) did not run presidential candidates, either. In 2006, again, most parties did not
Table 1. Candidates and Their Parties and Coalitions, Presidential Elections, 1998–2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1998 (N=12)</th>
<th>2002 (N=6)</th>
<th>2006 (N=7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FHCG: PSDB/PMDB/PFL/PPB/PTB</td>
<td>Serra: PSDB/PMDB</td>
<td>Alckmin: PSDB/PFL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciro: PPS/PL/PAN</td>
<td>Garotinho: PSB/PGT/PTC(PRJ)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristovam: PDT</td>
<td>Ciro: PPS/PDT/PTB</td>
<td>Heloisa: PSOL/PSTU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enéias: PRONA</td>
<td>José Maria: PSTU</td>
<td>José Maria: PSDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan da Frota: PMN</td>
<td>Rui Pimenta: PCO</td>
<td>Bivar: PSL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sirkis: PV</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ana Maria Rangel: PRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Maria: PSTU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>João de Deus: PT do B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Eymael: PSDC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruiz: PTN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sérgio Bueno: PSC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasco Neto: PSN(PHS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from TSE.

run presidential candidates. Only one electoral coalition was formed, aside from the two favorite (PT vs. PSDB): PSOL and PSTU.16

Roughly speaking, the number of presidential candidates was reduced by half (12 in 1998, 6 in 2002, 7 in 2006). While this drop cannot be attributed to verticalization alone, it is the smallest figure since Brazil’s return to democracy.17 Moreover, two patterns of behavior indicate that the judicial ruling pushed political elites to withdraw from the presidential race to concentrate on the district. First, only those potential presidential candidates positively evaluated in polls eventually ran, affording any possible electoral costs associated with the replication of the presidential electoral arrangement.18 Second, most of the smaller parties abstained from the presidential competition, remaining free to negotiate with coalition allies district by district to make sure the party would attain the electoral quotient in the proportional race (Sousa 2006).

The question remains, though, to what extent electoral coalition behavior changed due to verticalization. Persuasive evidence should include the proportional race, as all parties that avoided the presidential competition nominated congressional candidates via coalitions (Sousa 2006; Fleischer 2007). Besides, although the judicial ruling allowed “presidential abstainers” to form electoral coalitions as they pleased downward, most of these party labels still depended on the “presidential parties” to ally for Congress, thereby securing the chance of electing representatives. Therefore, which kinds of alliances have parties formed
in the district? A model can be constructed to test the estimated effects of the TSE’s decision on the formation of electoral coalitions, including their ideological profile.

**Minimum Winning Electoral Coalitions in Brazil**

The discussion of the theory and practice of minimum winning coalitions under presidentialism generates the following hypotheses:

**H1. Verticalization pushed parties to form minimum winning electoral coalitions, in Riker’s (1962) terms.** This should be so because the judicial ruling increased the costs of having unnecessary allies. The electoral payoffs—essentially, free media time and vote pooling—would be shared in all districts and the elections for president.

**H2. Verticalization pushed parties to form minimum winning electoral coalitions that were also more ideologically homogeneous.** This proposition is derived from De Swaan (1973) and Axelrod (1970, 1997), who explain that negotiations are easier to complete if the parties in the alliance are ideologically similar. As party leaders were induced to reach more complex electoral agreements—enclosing the races for president, federal deputy, and governor—we would expect those minimum winning alliances with similar parties to have prevailed.

These hypotheses were tested using data provided by the TSE, looking at three consecutive elections for federal deputy: before verticalization (1998) and after (2002 and 2006).

**Variable Measurement**

_The minimum winning principle._ In this analysis, minimum winning coalitions are considered to be all coalitions for the Federal Chamber of Deputies that are congruent in relation to the gubernatorial electoral alliance. As noted, in the Brazilian concurrent races, parties have incentives to synchronize their alliance partners in the district. Larger parties will help smaller ones pool ballots and attain the electoral quotient in the proportional race. In return, smaller parties will aid larger ones in getting more free media exposure to elect a governor. Since it is suboptimal to add electoral coalition members that are not expected to maximize these spoils, the alliances for federal deputy that are exactly equal to those for governor (like an image in the mirror) convey a minimum winning capacity.19
While Samuels's (2003) definition is similar, he is less rigorous by allowing electoral coalitions not to be the same. For example, Samuels allows one (or some) of the parties in the coalition for federal deputy not to be present in that for governor (not adding resources to the gubernatorial race), as long as that electoral coalition does not support a rival candidate for governor (in this case, abstaining from the gubernatorial election). The measure of congruence in this study, by contrast, captures an electoral agreement. This arrangement is based on estimated chances of winning that entail a minimum number of electoral coalition participants, in the district. At any rate, to the extent that this methodological choice is correct, we should observe a positive correlation between congruent (our definition) alliances and winning results, predominantly in the elections for federal deputy. In contrast to the majoritarian gubernatorial elections, in the proportional race, most parties expect to elect federal deputies. This association will be examined empirically.

Another clarification is necessary. Coalition theory is often applied to government formation, the unit of analysis being the party in government. This is equivalent to saying that coalition research deals with results. A winning coalition should control a majority of parliamentary seats (Gamson 1961; Riker 1962). Nevertheless, in pre-election alliances, the parties' expectations are more important than the result of the election. In the case of Brazil, operationalizing winning electoral coalitions as the ones that have actually won may be misleading.

By comparing the samples of electoral coalitions (1998, 2002, and 2006), we will be able to say whether politicians indeed formed more minimum winning alliances in 2002 and 2006, as expected.

*Ideological homogeneity*. The ideological homogeneity of a given minimum winning electoral coalition is assessed in standard deviations (dispersion around the mean) of ideology party scores within the minimum winning alliance. The smaller this value is, the higher the ideological consistency of the minimum winning electoral coalition.

Because parties are weighted by their size, small ones will not have much effect on this model. By comparing the samples of minimum winning electoral coalitions, we will be able to say whether 2002 and 2006 present more similar alliances, as hypothesized. The evaluation is done by situting these electoral coalitions along a scale of standard deviations, which descend as ideological homogeneity increases. The scale is divided into four equidistant segments, from the smallest to the highest standard deviations in each sample. For example, a zero standard deviation indicates a perfectly homogeneous electoral coalition, the case in which two or more parties have the same ideology score. A 2.92 standard deviation (the maximum value in the 1998 sample) indicates the least homogenous alliance in that election year.
Table 2. Power’s Ideology Scores, from 1 (left) to 10 (right)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PMDB</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDB</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSB</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTB</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFL</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPB(^a)</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCdoB</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP(^a)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>789</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)The PP is the old PPB.
Source: Data from Power, personal correspondence.

Table 3. Estimated Ideology Scores, from 1 (left) to 10 (right)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PCO, PSTU, PCB, PSOL</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTN, PHS,(^a) PST, PT do B, PTC, PRB, PSL, PSD, PAN, PSDC, PRTB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGT, PSC, PMN, PRP, PRONA, PRN(^b)</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td>6.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)The PHS is the new PSN.
\(^b\)The PRN changed its name to PTC.
Source: Calculations with data from Power.

To measure ideology, this analysis relies on Power’s questionnaires. In 1997, 2001, and 2005, he asked federal deputies in Brazil to locate parties on a scale ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right). The final classification on the spectrum is achieved with the exclusion of autodenominations. To locate the PT on the ideology scale, for example, the answers from members of that party do not count. Power’s scores are reproduced in table 2.

Unfortunately, Power has scores for only 11 parties in 1998 and 2002 and 12 in 2006, whereas 30 parties ran candidates for federal deputy in 1998 and 2002, and 29 did so in 2006. Because using Power’s measures alone would result in 55 dropped observations, and because no other ideological placements for the remaining smaller parties were available, the analysis used proxies.\(^{22}\) All estimated values are reported in table 3.

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Table 4. Number of Seats by Electoral Coalition Profile, Federal Chamber of Deputies, 1998–2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Congruent</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Not Congruent</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>54.16</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>45.83</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>62.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coaliton Totals</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculation data from TSE; Sousa 2006.

**Empirical Analysis**

The unit of analysis is the electoral coalition in each of Brazil's 27 districts. They include the 105 electoral alliances formed in 1998, the 140 formed in 2002, and the 144 formed in 2006. The data reveal that electoral coalitions are very important in Brazil, although the number of seats acquired via these alliances has diminished over the years. Out of 513 legislative seats, 456 were won via alliances in 1998. In 2002, 446 federal deputies won the elections via coalitions. In 2006, 409 federal deputies were elected via these electoral alliances (see table 4).

Comparing 1998 to 2002, it is clear that congruent electoral coalitions, as defined in this article, present higher rates of winning results, as anticipated. In 1998, those parties that synchronized their electoral coalition partners in the proportional and the gubernatorial elections totaled 8.33 percent more federal deputies than those that did not. In 2002, this percentage was almost three times higher, 24.67 percent. It is a sign that political actors have reacted to verticalization as predicted; that is, prioritizing those partners they evaluated as crucial to win. In 2006, the second election under verticalization, however, results point in the opposite direction: those parties that formed the same electoral coalitions for federal deputy and governor won 15.9 percent fewer seats than those that did not.

Minimum winning electoral coalitions, as defined here, are indeed part of the Brazilian political reality. The data are compiled in percentages in table 5. In 1998, before verticalization, party leaders were already forming alliances that could maximize electoral exchanges and bring winning results, with 52.38 percent of the coalitions for federal deputy meeting the minimum winning criterion. Furthermore, there is evidence in support of the first hypothesis; namely, that the judicial

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>1998</th>
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<th>2002</th>
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<th>2006</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MWEC</td>
<td>Not MWEC</td>
<td>MWEC</td>
<td>Not MWEC</td>
<td>MWEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>52.38</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47.61</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>58.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>140</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculations with data from TSE.

decision, when forcing the inclusion of the presidential race in the electoral calculus, increased the costs of having unnecessary allies. In 2002, under verticalization, there were 6.19 percent more minimum winning alliances, with 58.57 percent meeting the minimum winning criterion. Nevertheless, in 2006, there was a reflux in this pattern: the percentage of minimum winning electoral coalitions is virtually equal to that of 1998, 52.08 percent.

At the same time that political elites formed more minimum winning electoral coalitions under verticalization, they also joined electoral coalitions more often, with a 33 percent increase in the total number of alliances for federal deputy between 1998 and 2002. In general, this corroborates the logic according to which party bosses concentrated their efforts on the district. That is, in 2002, facing the impossibility of allying with certain parties due to verticalization, political actors focused on pivotal parties to elect representatives (forming more minimum winning electoral coalitions). In the cases in which this was not possible, they looked for other available partners. In 2006, the total number of electoral coalitions is 144, very similar to that of 2002. But, as already observed, the number of minimum winning alliances receded to that of 1998.

What do the data tell us about the ideological profile of these minimum winning electoral coalitions? First, it is clear that party leaders prioritize ideologically similar allies, as suggested by De Swaan (1973) and Axelrod (1970, 1997). The Brazilian minimum winning alliances in 1998, 2002, and 2006 cluster in the first and second segments, with the smallest ideological standard deviations. For example, in 1998, 67.27 percent were either perfectly or near perfectly homogeneous, with standard deviations between zero and 0.73 (see table 6). In 2002 and 2006, the percentages were smaller—but still consistent—with 46.34 percent and 53.33 percent, respectively, of the minimum winning coalitions fitting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Standard Deviation</td>
<td>0.0–0.73</td>
<td>0.73–1.46</td>
<td>1.46–2.19</td>
<td>2.19–2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>67.27</td>
<td>21.82</td>
<td>7.27</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N = 55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculations with data from Power and estimated ideology scores.

Table 7. Minimum Winning Electoral Coalitions from More to Less Ideologically Homogeneous, Federal Chamber of Deputies, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>IV</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Standard Deviation</td>
<td>0.0–0.64</td>
<td>0.64–1.28</td>
<td>1.28–1.93</td>
<td>1.93–2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>46.34</td>
<td>26.83</td>
<td>13.41</td>
<td>13.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N = 82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculations with data from Power and estimated ideology scores.

Table 8. Minimum Winning Electoral Coalitions from More to Less Ideologically Homogeneous, Federal Chamber of Deputies, 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Standard Deviation</td>
<td>0.0–0.52</td>
<td>0.52–1.04</td>
<td>1.04–1.56</td>
<td>1.56–2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>53.33</td>
<td>21.33</td>
<td>17.33</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N = 75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculations with data from Power and estimated ideology scores.

the 2002 and 2006 equivalent standard deviation groups (tables 7, 8). Only a few minimum winning alliances fit the fourth segment, the least ideologically homogeneous: 3.64 percent in 1998, 13.41 percent in 2002, and 8.00 percent in 2006.

These results notwithstanding, evidence contradicts the hypothesis that verticalization pushed parties to form minimum winning electoral coalitions that were also more ideologically homogeneous. In comparison to 1998, the 2002 and 2006 samples are more evenly dispersed along the ideology scale—toward the highest ideological standard deviation (the least homogeneous segment). Summing up the first and second segments, with relatively lower standard deviations, in 1998,

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Standard Deviation</td>
<td>0.0–0.73</td>
<td>0.73–1.46</td>
<td>1.46–2.19</td>
<td>2.19–2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>68.52</td>
<td>22.22</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N = 54a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excluded from the analysis: 1 MWEG, between the PT and the PL.
Source: Calculations with data from Power and estimated ideology scores.

89.09 percent of the minimum winning alliances were more ideologically consistent. After verticalization, this percentage was smaller: 73.17 percent, in 2002; and 74.66 percent, in 2006. Looking at the second half of the scale (with relatively higher standard deviations), in 1998, 10.91 percent of the minimum winning coalitions were less ideologically homogeneous. After verticalization, this percentage more than doubled: 26.82 percent in 2002 and 25.33 percent in 2006.

Even if one of the least ideologically compatible minimum winning electoral coalitions is excluded from the sample, the data still follow the same pattern. Specifically, in 2002, the PT (left) formed an alliance for president with the PL (right), in a successful attempt to make Lula’s candidacy more palatable to the financial market; this was different from 1998. Due to verticalization, these parties remained together in electoral coalitions in most of the districts—as opposed to only one in 1998. Based on this preliminary information, an argument could be made that the 2002 sample is biased—relatively less ideologically homogeneous, mainly because of those minimum winning electoral coalitions including both the PT and the PL. But as tables 9 and 10 show, excluding these alliances from the samples (1998 and 2002), after verticalization, parties still formed fewer ideologically homogeneous minimum winning electoral coalitions. Also, excluding the minimum winning electoral coalitions that contain both the PT and the PL, the percentage of relatively less ideologically consistent alliances (the third and fourth segments) doubles again: from 9.26 percent in 1998 to 19.11 percent in 2002.24

The data presented here reinforce the claim that to conform to the 2002 judicial ruling, party leaders in Brazil indeed re-evaluated the electoral payoffs inherent in adding coalition members nationally; this choice, under the constraint of verticalization, is observed in the district. In 2002, political actors formed more alliances that could maximize electoral exchanges (free media time and vote pooling), frequently limiting their electoral coalitions to those partners they viewed as indispensable to winning the elections.
Table 10. Minimum Winning Electoral Coalitions from More to Less Ideologically Homogeneous, Federal Chamber of Deputies, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>I</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Standard Deviation</td>
<td>0.0–0.64</td>
<td>0.64–1.28</td>
<td>1.28–1.93</td>
<td>1.93–2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>52.94</td>
<td>27.94</td>
<td>11.76</td>
<td>7.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N = 68*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excluded from the analysis: 14 MVEC, between the PT and the PL.

Source: Calculations with data from Power and estimated ideology scores.

Although party leaders continued to form minimum winning alliances with ideologically similar partners under verticalization, the data show that they were inhibited in this regard. This is an indication that the judicial electoral engineering, in the context of the Brazilian nested races, forced party bosses to be more aggressive with regard to their electoral survival—at the expense of policy.

In the 2006 results, the number of minimum winning electoral coalitions refluxed (to that of 1998). Also, this strategy—of maximizing electoral payoffs while forming alliances enclosing only those parties that, at least in the races for the Federal Chamber of Deputies and governor, could offer something in return—did not work so well. In 2006, the minimum winning coalitions won 42.05 percent of the legislative seats, while the correspondent percentages for 1998 and 2002 were higher: 54.16 percent and 62.33 percent, respectively. A possible explanation is that due to the introduction of an electoral threshold for the first time in the 2006 elections, parties had fewer available electoral partners they could negotiate with to form coalitions.25 Above all, to attain the threshold, several party labels announced they were going to fuse, which made electoral agreements more difficult.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Beginning with the premise that government coalition models can be applied—with some important modifications—to the electoral arena, this study has offered theoretical insights and empirical evidence on the formation of minimum winning electoral coalitions under presidentialism. In this environment, it is important to know the conditions under which minimum winning alliances form: they can augment the chances of electoral success by optimizing the use of electoral resources, boosting political players' bargaining power with the executive afterward.

In Brazil's multiple levels of elections, the incentives to form an electoral coalition are tangled. In each district, political parties with can-
didates for federal deputy may count on other party labels with gubernatorial candidates to fare better in the proportional elections. In return, those parties running in the concurrent majoritarian race for governor also have more support to make their candidates competitive. In sum, actors often synchronize electoral coalition partners in the district to maximize winning results while minimizing electoral efforts.

Based on three consecutive elections, this study showed how party leaders in Brazil reacted to a judicial ruling that enforced electoral coalitions nationally. Under verticalization, political elites were forced to include the presidential election in the minimum winning calculus, thus reevaluating the payoffs inherent to replicating the presidential electoral arrangement downward. Immediately after verticalization was enacted, parties restricted themselves further to those electoral coalition participants they believed capable of delivering winning results—even allying with party labels more distant on the ideology spectrum.

Also, the results suggest that federalism affects electoral competition “from below,” somewhat similar to what Jones (1997a, b) and Samuels (2000a, b, 2003) have demonstrated in the cases of Argentina and Brazil, respectively. In Brazil, as seen here, the TSE’s decision to make electoral alliances vertical had unanticipated effects. This is another indication that subnational variables significantly influence electoral coalition formation.

NOTES

I am grateful to Claudete Rocha for her work as a research assistant, and for FIU’s financial support. Other people were crucial for the development of this article. I thank Guenadi Milanov for his valuable help and patience. I am also grateful to Tatiana Kostadinova, Timothy J. Power, Richard Olson, Ronald Cox, Rezwan Hussein, Vivaldo Sousa, and David Fleischer.

1. This article uses the terms Congress and Federal Chamber of Deputies interchangeably to refer to the proportional elections for the Federal Chamber of Deputies.

2. Brazil uses proportional representation, with 27 multimember districts to elect 513 federal deputies.

3. Shugart defines as localizing tendencies “those that inhibit party cohesion and the control of national leaders over locally elected rank-and-file” (1995, 330). This would be the case for Brazil.

4. Coattails are defined in U.S. politics as happening from presidents downward. “The rest of the party ticket came into office clinging to their sturdy coattails” (Hershey 2007, 272).

5. “If parties AB and CD ally to run presidential candidates, congruent alliances would have AB and CD running gubernatorial and deputy candidates in a given state. In contrast, incongruent alliances might see AB and CD running presidential candidates, while AC and BD ran gubernatorial and deputy candidates” (Samuels 2003, 89).

7. These authors explain that Samuels draws conclusions from an interaction model that omits constitutive terms. "The evidence from a fully specified model indicates that, if there is a coattails effect in Brazilian elections, then it is a presidential one and not a gubernatorial one" (Brambor et al. 2006, 16).

8. In the open-list system, candidates are not ranked; those politicians with more votes are elected. Since the list is open, one single list for the alliance is formed. The candidates with more votes, regardless of their parties, are elected.

9. The seats of the Federal Chamber of Deputies are distributed in each district according to an electoral quotient (valid votes divided by seats). The number of votes each party list obtains is divided by this electoral quotient. The result is the party quotient, and each party list elects as many federal deputies as indicated by its party quotient. The larger the magnitude, the more proportional the relationship between votes and seats (Taagepera and Shugart 1989).

10. Lourenço (2003) shows a positive relationship between free media time and winning results.

11. Shugart and Carey (1992) explain that the Brazilian presidency is one of the most powerful in the world, with strong reactive, proactive, and agenda powers.


13. For similar reasons, governors also court the president. "Subnational governments lack primary economic authority within their jurisdictions, they avoid hard budget constraints by borrowing, they share revenue extensively, and the central government can unilaterally alter allocations of authority and responsibility among the levels of government" (Ames 2001, 22).

14. To be clear, verticalization did not require electoral alliances to be made exactly of the same parties, neither vertically (from the presidency downward) nor horizontally (federal deputy and governor, across Brazil).

15. The PSN changed its name to PHS. Please refer to the list of abbreviations on page 107 for the full names of all parties.

16. The PSOL was created in 2006 as another leftist party, an alternative to the PT and the neoliberal agenda of President Lula and his PT government.

17. Other motives might have influenced parties not to run. For example, the PFL's potential presidential candidate, Roseana Sarney, was involved in a corruption scandal. The repercussions of the police investigation made the PFL eventually decide not to nominate a presidential candidate.

18. There are three exceptions: the PSTU, the PCO, and the PSOL, the tiny extreme left. These parties' objectives were essentially to criticize the "neoliberal course" of the leftist PT. They did so by running their own presidential candidates, acquiring some minutes to criticize Lula and the PT in the media. For more information, see Cucolo 2002; Saiati 2004.

19. In support of this argument, it can be noted that gubernatorial candidates know exactly the minimum percentage of the vote they need to be elected: 50.1 percent. In other words, gubernatorial candidates, when forming their electoral alliances, are expected to target a minimum winning threshold.
20. Calculations are available from the author on request.

21. Party size is the party’s vote share, district by district, in the previous election. This information is reported by Jairo Nicolau on his website (see Nicolau n.d.).

22. The proxies were based on the literature that classifies Brazilian parties as belonging to three ideological blocs: left, center, and right. See Limongi and Figueiredo 1995; Schmitt 1999; Carreirão 2006. Explanations of these estimated ideology scores are available on request.

23. Party composition of the minimum winning electoral coalitions is available on request.

24. Ideologically consistent alliances prevail nevertheless, in conformity with the previous samples (1998 and 2002), which include those electoral coalitions between the PT and the PL.

25. In general, 5 percent of the national vote, with 2 percent distributed among at least nine districts, was required for the party to have both access to public resources, such as free time on TV, and leadership in Congress. The electoral threshold (cláusula de barreira) was declared unconstitutional by the Federal Supreme Court right after the 2006 elections. Out of 29 electoral parties, 7 did not attain the threshold in 2006.

**ABBREVIATIONS**

- PAN Partido dos Aposentados da Nação
- PC do B Partido Comunista do Brasil
- PCB Partido Comunista Brasileiro
- PCO Partido da Causa Operária
- PDT Partido Democrático Trabalhista
- PFL Partido da Frente Liberal
- PGT Partido Geral dos Trabalhadores
- PHS Partido Humanista da Solidariedade
- PL Partido Liberal
- PMDB Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro
- PMN Partido da Mobilização Nacional
- PP Partido Progressista
- PPB Partido Progressista Brasileiro
- PPS Partido Popular Socialista
- PR Partido da República
- PRB Partido Republicano Brasileiro
- PRN Partido da Reconstrução Nacional
- PRONA Partido da Reediﬁcação da Ordem Nacional
- PRP Partido Republicano Progressista
- PRTB Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro
- PSB Partido Socialista Brasileiro
- PSC Partido Social Cristão
- PSD Partido Social Democrático

- Party of the Nation’s Retirees
- Communist Party of Brazil
- Brazilian Communist Party
- Workers’ Cause Party
- Democratic Labor Party
- Liberal Front Party
- General Party of the Workers
- Humanist Party of Solidarity
- Liberal Party
- Brazilian Democratic Movement Party
- Party of National Mobilization
- Progressive Party
- Brazilian Progressive Party
- Socialist People’s Party
- Republic Party
- Brazilian Republic Party
- National Reconstruction Party
- Party of the Reconstruction of the National Order
- Progressive Republican Party
- Brazilian Labor Renewal Party
- Brazilian Socialist Party
- Christian Social Party
- Social Democratic Party
PSDB Partido da Social Democracia Brasilena
PSDC Partido Social Democrata Cristão
PSL Partido Social Liberal
PSN Partido Solidarista Nacional
PSOL Partido Socialismo e Liberdade
PST Partido Social Trabalhista
PSTU Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado
PT do B Partido Trabalhista do Brasil
PT Partido dos Trabalhadores
PTB Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro
PTC Partido Trabalhista Cristão
PTN Partido Trabalhista Nacional
PV Partido Verde
TSE Tribunal Superior Eleitoral

Brazilian Social Democracy Party
Christian Social Democratic Party
Social Liberal Party
National Solidarity Party
Party of Socialism and Liberty
Social Labor Party
United Socialist Workers' Party
Labor Party of Brazil
Workers' Party
Brazilian Labor Party
Christian Labor Party
National Labor Party
Green Party
Electoral Supreme Court

REFERENCES


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