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Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting Behavior of National Legislators

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Are subnational political elites, such as governors, capable of affecting the voting behavior of national representatives even in the face of high legislative discipline? We address this question by estimating the exogenous causal effect of gubernatorial influence on the voting behavior of national legislators in Mexico, where constitutional provisions guarantee that the political survival times of governors and legislators are fixed and known ex ante and where we can thus know precisely which legislators will leave congress before their state governor’s term has expired. We posit that such legislators will be more willing to represent gubernatorial preferences because they expect the governor to find them employment upon finishing their stay in congress. We find that governors whose terms end after the term of the national assembly are able to systematically increase the voting cohesion of legislators from their own party and state and that these effects are substantively important.

There is growing interest among comparative analysts of legislatures in understanding whether powerful subnational actors are able to influence the behavior of national legislators (Benton 2009; Cantu and Desposato 2009; Carey 2007; Carey and Reinhardt 2004; Cheibub, Figueiredo, and Limongi 2009; Desposato 2003, 2004; Jones and Hwang 2005; Pereira and Mueller 2004). The issue of subnational influence over national legislators is especially important in new democracies and in those weakened by continuous economic and social upheaval, such as many of those found in Latin America. Diaz-Cayeros (2006) and Garman, Haggard, and Willis (2001) have argued forcefully that the relationship between the states and the federation can have a profound impact on policy making, especially in the fiscal arena. Coherent policymaking can indeed depend on the ability of national politicians to discipline state actors, such as governors, so that subnational conflicts do not preclude national Pareto-improving solutions (Rodden and Wibbels 2005). Conversely, governors can be instrumental in ensuring that copartisan legislators from their states support bills that are important to national party leaders. In any case, the possibility that governors or other state elites may affect the voting behavior of their state’s delegation in the national congress is an important topic in the agenda of federalism.

Persuasive theoretical arguments suggest that subnational political elites (governors) can in principle affect the voting behavior of national representatives (deputies) in federal regimes. Empirical verification of these arguments, however, has remained elusive. The search for “subnational effects” has led scholars to look for instances in which national legislators coming from the same state vote in a similar way to the detriment of national party unity. It indeed makes sense to look for state effects wherever legislators face cross-pressures from national and state actors but, as we explain below, gubernatorial effects can exist even when the interests of state and national elites are aligned rather than at odds. Our first contribution is to confirm that state effects exist even in federal legislatures with relatively disciplined parties. We study whether gubernatorial influence systematically determines the voting cohesion of legislators that belong to the governor’s party and that hail from the governor’s state, i.e., those that belong to the same “state-party delegation.” We examine whether a governor can push her state’s federal deputies to vote as a cohesive unit, regardless of whether they vote with or against their party’s majority. While this might seem a less direct way of measuring state effects in the national legislature, it is in fact a different empirically verifiable implication of the idea that state political elites may intervene in...
national politics through federal representatives.\textsuperscript{1} With this approach, we have the leverage to discern whether gubernatorial effects exist even when governors might be in agreement with national leaders.

More importantly, previous studies of state effects rely on observational data where the mechanism that assigns gubernatorial influence is unknown. Under these circumstances, distinguishing the causal effect of gubernatorial pressure from the dictates of national party leaders, voter demands, or ideological similarities among legislators belonging to the same state is a tall task. To put it differently, demonstrating empirically that state effects exist does not necessarily mean that these effects can be attributed to gubernatorial influence. Assessing the potential influence of governors on the behavior of deputies in statistical analyses requires, at the very least, that we understand the process that assigns varying degrees of gubernatorial influence.

In this work we use differences in the expected length of political careers of deputies and governors as a proxy for gubernatorial influence, as we explain below. Given the possibility of reelection, the problem researchers face is that we do not generally know at the time of measurement whether the political careers of governors and deputies are about to finish (a strong incumbent surprisingly loses an election), drastically change course (anticipating a tough election, an incumbent chooses to switch parties), or be extended for the foreseeable future (an incumbent facing a tough challenge actually wins reelection). Lack of knowledge about the mechanisms that “assign” length of political careers to governors and deputies opens the possibility of measurement error in determining the power of governors as well as the ability of deputies to withstand their pressures. Omitted variable bias is also a concern, as the policy preferences of deputies and governors may both be shaped by subnational level factors that are not explicitly controlled by the researcher. Finally, reverse causation may be at play, for example, if the voting behavior of a particularly cohesive group of deputies helps extend the political career of their state’s governor. Under these circumstances, measures of statistical association between governor characteristics and the voting behavior of representatives cannot identify a causal effect (Holland 1986; Rubin 1974).

Our second contribution is to solve this “unknown survival time” problem, providing convincing evidence that governors have a causal impact on the behavior of national legislators. We estimate gubernatorial effects on the voting cohesion of party-state delegations by taking advantage of variation in the terms of governors and congressional representatives that is exogenous to the hypothesized relation of cause and effect. By considering the case of Mexico, our identification strategy capitalizes on two constitutional features of that country’s federal political system: (1) the staggered calendar used to elect governors\textsuperscript{2} and (2) the contrasting political time-horizons of governors, who are elected for nonrenewable six-year periods, and their deputies, who are elected for three-year periods without the possibility of immediate reelection.

Because of these features, we know at the beginning of any given legislature that some governors will outlast the terms of their state representatives to the national congress while others will leave their posts before the end of the legislative term. Some governors are thus in a position to reward loyalty by securing jobs for their deputies who must cycle out of Congress at the end of their single three-year term. One would expect that deputies from states where the governor remains in office past the end of the legislative term will be more willing to represent the governor’s preferences because they depend on this political leader for a future job. Simply put, we hypothesize that the governors who outlast their state’s copartisan legislators are more influential. Because gubernatorial and congressional electoral calendars are fixed, and because neither governors nor legislators are capable of unilaterally extending their terms of office, our design provides a plausible claim of exogeneity for “expected political survival times.” While this constitutional combination might not exist in other nations, our findings shed light on how legislative politics work in federal regimes because we provide abundant evidence that the causal link between gubernatorial influence and legislators’ voting behavior is not spurious.

We present the case for the existence of gubernatorial effects in four sections. In the first section, we expand upon the reasons that lead us to expect gubernatorial effects on voting behavior; we focus particularly on previous evidence of state effects in Mexico and elsewhere and on the instruments that allow Mexican governors to shape the voting behavior of copartisan national deputies from their states. In the second and third sections we describe

\textsuperscript{1}We focus on explaining differences in the voting cohesion of subsets of legislators, an oft-used strategy in the literature on state effects (Cantú and Desposato 2009; Carey 2009; Cheibub, Figueiredo, and Limongi 2009; Jones and Hwang 2005).

\textsuperscript{2}Between 3 and 10 states (out of 32) elect new governors each year except the second of a president’s six-year administration. State constitutions determine the timing of elections.
our data, discuss operationalization of relevant indicators, and develop and test our model of legislators’ voting behavior. Our empirical strategy involves estimating an item-response theory model based on roll-call data for three successive national legislatures in Mexico’s post-1997 democratic era. This strategy yields individual-level ideal points, which in effect provide summary scores of the voting behavior of legislators.3 We focus on the variance of the ideal points of legislators that belong to the same state-party delegation to build “delegation dispersion scores,” our proxies for voting cohesion—a strategy used by Jones and Hwang (2005). We then model state-party delegation dispersion scores as a function of governors’ remaining time in office. If strong governors are indeed capable of promoting voting unity among copartisan deputies from their states, we would expect the length of gubernatorial tenure to depress state-party delegation dispersion scores. Indeed, we find compelling evidence of gubernatorial effects among Mexico’s national legislators, even though these effects do not necessarily lower national party cohesion. We elaborate on the contribution this discovery makes to current debates in the conclusion.

**The Possibility of Gubernatorial Effects**

Students of legislative behavior often note that legislators are beholden to multiple principals whose interests may at times be at loggerheads (Carey 2009). Examples of such principals include voters in the legislators’ home districts, the country’s president, national party leaders or subnational political elites. Because of the prominent position of subnational political elites—especially governors—in federal systems, scholars studying federal legislatures often expect to uncover state effects in national legislative voting. Indeed, under pressure from competing principals (national party leaders and governors) one would expect to see legislative parties unable to muster voting discipline, presumably resulting in low levels of party unity.

There are, indeed, empirical findings that suggest that federal legislators often vote with their state counterparts, even when this might put them at cross-purposes with their legislative party leaders. In particular, an interesting debate has developed in the literature on Brazil’s legislature concerning the power and influence of state governors. Samuels (2000) notes that despite the legal possibility of consecutive reelection, many deputies do not stay in the Brazilian Chamber, preferring to cycle back to the state and municipal governments that control important resources, a disposition he refers to as “regressive ambition.” Because governors and other local political elites control resources, it stands to reason that national deputies may be keen to do the governors’ bidding in national congress. Despite the relatively strong standing of Brazilian governors, however, Desposato (2003, 2004) and Cheibub, Figueiredo, and Limongi (2009) detect only weak state effects in the national congress, where national party leaders and the executive are powerful enough to discipline backbenchers and therefore mute the potentially disruptive consequences of Brazil’s federal system.4

In a different setting, Hix (2002) argues that members of the European Parliament—a quasi-federal institution—are more likely to vote with their “national delegation” than with their supranational “party bloc” when faced with competing demands from different principals. In this case, sub-European national elites are seemingly more powerful than European party leaders in shaping the voting behavior of European parliamentarians. In contrast, Jones and Hwang (2005) find no evidence of state effects in the voting behavior of deputies in Argentina’s province-centric federal arrangement, a phenomenon they attribute to the willingness of governors to delegate control of their deputies to the national party in return for fiscal gains.

Because the literature mostly considers state effects as emerging from competing principals’ dilemmas, tests to detect these effects often look for instances of clear conflict between state elites and national elites to investigate how deputies vote in these circumstances. As Cheibub, Figueiredo, and Limongi put it, “[i]n deciding how to behave in the assembly, legislators must consider not only their personal preferences but also those of their constituents, their

3In educational testing, item response theory (IRT) is used to infer students’ abilities based on responses to exam questions (items). In political science, IRT models are commonly employed to infer the “ideological stance” of legislators based on their observed votes on bills, yielding inferences about “ideal points” that are similar to Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). See Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) and Martin and Quinn (2002) for applications of IRT in legislative studies.

4The debate on Brazil centers less on whether governors affect the behavior of national deputies than on whether their influence can be overcome by party discipline. For more on this debate, see Ames (2001), Armijo, Faucher and Dembinska (2006), Hagopian, Gervasoni and Moraes (2009), Pereira and Mueller (2004), Samuels and Shugart (2000).
parties, and regional and national leaders. These preferences rarely coincide, and the issue becomes how to detect whether existing conditions favor one type of interest over another” (2009, 2). Indeed, open disagreement between national and subnational elites that ends with deputies supporting the latter constitutes the most obvious telltale evidence of the existence of state effects.

However, the possibility of state effects on legislators’ voting behavior exists even in the absence of competing principals and even in the presence of relatively high party discipline in congressional voting. To see why, imagine a country in which governors are the only actors with the means, opportunity, and motivation to control the votes of their states’ deputies. If governors from the same party were able to coordinate and support similar policy positions, all legislators would vote together and we would never see within-party variation in voting behavior. Examining the frequency of votes with or against the party majority would lead us to conclude erroneously that national party leaders impose discipline when in fact state actors are solely in control of the behavior of national representatives. In a less drastic scenario, national party leaders could enlist the support of governors to ensure that copartisan deputies from their state systematically uphold the national party line. This type of state effect could even increase the voting cohesion of the congressional party bloc, resulting in higher party discipline than would obtain in the absence of gubernatorial pressure. In short, the possibility of gubernatorial influence can exist even in situations in which the interests of multiple principals with a stake in the voting behavior of national legislators are not completely divergent. In these circumstances, we might not expect state effects to systematically erode a party’s capacity to vote cohesively, but we would certainly expect state elites to be a force to be reckoned with. Gubernatorial influence over legislators’ voting behavior can thus appear in situations of multiple principals, whether they compete over legislators’ loyalties or not, a possibility that has not been widely considered.

Alongside this issue, the empirical literature has yet to produce convincing evidence about the causal mechanisms that presumably produce state effects. Even where patterns of correlation in the voting behavior of deputies from the same subnational delegation can be documented, it is not entirely obvious that state effects should be attributed to the influence of governors or other subnational political elites. Legislators belonging to the same subnational delegation may vote in similar ways for a variety of reasons. Pressure from their state governor to vote consistently in the same direction is certainly a potential mechanism, but so is the existence of shared ideological preferences or links to constituencies with similar socioeconomic characteristics. For this reason, designing tests that can help us gauge the causal impact of subnational elites on deputies is an obvious concern. Our research design allows us to unequivocally trace differences in subgroup voting behavior to gubernatorial influence.

Our tests take advantage of constitutional features of Mexico’s federal arrangement, where governors have recently taken on more conspicuous political roles. Before the transition to democracy in the late 1990s, the Mexican Congress was an extremely hierarchical and centralized legislative body where the hegemonic Partido de la Revolución Institucional (PRI) consistently won more than 95% of all single-member districts, small opposition parties were largely figureheads without the ability to influence policy, and legislators rarely, if ever, voted against their caucus leaders (Nacif 2002). Yet, the federal political structure embodied in the Mexican constitution has resurfaced more recently, especially after the PRI’s loss of the presidency in 2000 (Hernández Rodríguez 2003).5

Mexico is characterized by wide cross-state diversity in terms of levels of development, social structures, and political preferences, which is a common feature of federal systems. This diversity forces politicians to adopt different vote-maximizing strategies at the state level even as they nurture a common national programmatic identity. Greene (2008) shows that state delegates to the 1999 PRI National Convention held ideological preferences that were determined by the type of opposition they faced in different states. If state representatives to Congress hold policy positions similar to those of state delegates to the PRI National Convention—a plausible assumption—the very possibility of effective electoral competition could lead to distinct state effects in congressional voting. These effects would obtain regardless of gubernatorial pressure. Indeed, based on an analysis of legislative voting behavior, Cantú and Desposato (2009) substantiate the existence of “state effects” within some party delegations in the Mexican Legislature. In other words, when the unit of analysis is the state-party delegation, as

5As Díaz-Cayeros (2006) notes, governors in the early post-Revolutionary period were willing and able to stand up to the national government to push for policies they preferred.
opposed to the state delegation, Cantú and Desposato show that the incidence of congruent voting behavior is higher than one would expect by chance. Using a different metric and research design, Betanzo (2009) is able to substantiate cross-state variation in the number of legislator-sponsored initiatives to reform the national fiscal code, a finding that suggests great variation in levels of state assertiveness concerning fiscal matters.

We still need to show, however, that voting unity within state-party delegations is at least partially driven by governors. To explore the possibility of gubernatorial effects, we need to ask whether governors have the means, motivation, and opportunity to press federal representatives from their states to vote together in a systematic fashion. First, governors spend resources to help federal representatives get elected. The reason behind this decision lies in Mexico’s peculiar fiscal system (Díaz-Cayeros 2006; Flamand 2006). A governor that is able to send a large contingent from his state to the national congress will usually have more success at winning federal funds in the annual budget rounds. State executives raise extremely low proportions of their state budgets and depend on the federal government for up to 95% of their annual spending. Therefore, the budget rounds that take place every year in the Chamber are crucial for the state’s ability to spend in the next fiscal year.

Mexican governors are also extremely active in promoting local candidates for national positions and in nurturing their political careers. Since the late 1990s, governors have increased their ability to nominate congressional candidates and have augmented their control of public resources without suffering a concomitant change in making their expenditures accountable to voters. Admittedly, formal procedures to select candidates to federal congress vary widely across the three major parties (Wuhs 2006, 43). The former opposition parties—Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) and Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD)—have always had more decentralized candidate selection practices than the PRI and did not change their selection procedures radically during the transition to democracy (Bruhn 1997; Mizrahi 2003). They rely mostly on district-level nominating conventions (PAN) and primaries open to all voters (PRD) to select congressional candidates. Due to the demands of rising electoral competition, the PRI informally devolved much of the party’s selection of single-member district (SMD) congressional candidates to its state governors even before their loss of the presidency. However, there is ample evidence that despite variation in formal nomination procedures “governors from all major parties have held increasing power over SMD candidacies for the Chamber since [...] the mid to late 1990s” (Langston 2010).

All else equal, local level control over nominations undermines national party elites, but these may retain a measure of control if they have power over campaign financing. Parties receive public funds for campaigning, and national party leaders are charged with disbursing money to their state chapters as they see fit. For example, more than a third of all public funding transferred from the country’s electoral management body to political parties in 2003 went to state affiliates, and almost one half of those transfers were used to fund individual campaigns (Poiré 2005, 11–12). The rest of the monies was retained by the national party organizations to spend on national media appeals to sell the party label and its electoral platform as a whole—that is, most of these funds were not spent on individual deputy candidates. Governors of all three major parties expend money and manpower to support the campaigns of copartisan deputy candidates, making up the difference between national party disbursements and the amount individual deputies need to run competitive campaigns in single-member districts.

Finally and most importantly, governors are not held accountable for the vast amount of federal resources that they receive and spend each year (Flamand 2006; Pardinas 2008; Ríos 2009). The federal transfers that are earmarked for different spending categories come legally under the purview of the country’s national accounting agency, but in practice this bureau finds it difficult to monitor or sanction misuse of funds. Another large portion of federal monies goes to revenue-sharing funds that are legally considered part of the states’ budgets and therefore are audited by the local assembly’s budget office—which is almost always controlled politically by the governors. A large quantity of resources and a lack of accountability in how they are spent allow governors to distribute a wide array of bureaucratic and political posts in their respective states. According to Langston and Aparicio (2008), 62% of all deputies return to their states for a political position after their three-year congressional term ends, while over 72% of SMD deputies return to their states to

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6Interviews with Francisco Suárez Dávila, former PRI deputy and ex-president of the Treasury Committee in the Chamber (July 10, 2009), and with Ricardo Monreal, former PRD governor (February 17, 2009).
continue their careers. Samuels’s “regressive ambition” is certainly present in Mexico, where the political opportunity structure often drives ambitious politicians back to their home states. The ability to help ambitious deputies continue their political careers after the end of their non-renewable three-year term in the Chamber allows governors at least shared control over their state’s deputies while they are in Congress.

We do not mean to imply from this discussion that national party leaders lack influence on voting unity in Congress. To the contrary, national party leaders and their agents in the legislature are crucial in determining committee assignments and have agenda control over bills.7 As many specialists in Mexican legislative politics have pointed out, caucus leaders hold an impressive array of intrachamber resources with which they can manage the votes of their legislators. These resources include money to hire assistants and buy office equipment, access to foreign junkets, and, most importantly, committee leadership assignments (Rivera Sánchez 2004; Weldon 2005). Legislative leaders control the flow of initiatives both into and out of committee and can remove their party’s committee leaders with few regulatory constraints.

Nor do we mean to imply that governors will always choose to direct state legislators to vote against the party line. However, disputes over the distribution of tax income and other fiscal matters could pit governors against national party leaders; such disputes have been common over the past decade and have led caucus leaders to take great care in negotiating with their party’s governors. Furthermore, many governors have political aspirations beyond the state executive office and could conceivably use their influence over national representatives to build a recognizable personal reputation. Contrary to the rigid hierarchy of the old political system, governors can now confront the president without fear of being removed from their posts or allocated fewer federal transfers (Figueras Zanabria 2009) and can thus withhold support for prominent bills in a calculated effort to build notoriety. Yet, the reality of relatively high party discipline in the Mexican Congress leads us to discount the possibility of finding within-state similarities in voting patterns that are powerful enough to overcome within-party similarities. To paraphrase the French aphorism, we still expect two PRI representatives, one of whom hails from Oaxaca, to have a more similar voting behavior than two Oaxacan representatives, one of whom belongs to the PRI. We do expect however that variations in the voting behavior of national legislators will allow us to detect differences in the cohesion of the state-party delegations to which they belong. Since state executives have the means, motivation, and opportunity to influence the behavior of their deputies, we expect these differences to be systematically driven by variation in gubernatorial influence.

**Research Design and Data Description**

We have argued that governors in Mexico, like governors in other federal political systems, have the capacity and the motivation to affect the voting behavior of copartisan national deputies that hail from the states they govern. Gubernatorial influence is ultimately possible, especially in a system with no consecutive reelection, because governors have some measure of control over the political careers of legislators from their states. This control occurs both through legislative nominations that increase the probability of selecting congenial agents and through promises of job offers to term-limited legislators. A governor will be better able to affect the political career of a legislator—and therefore his voting record—to the extent that her political life in the governor’s office exceeds the single three-year term of the legislator. Otherwise, legislators will feel less pressured to represent the preferences of their governor. The constitutional prohibition of consecutive reelection for legislators and state executives renders the assignment of differences in the expected political survival of governors and legislators truly exogenous to observed voting behavior. Because the expected congressional career of legislators is always fixed at three years, governor terms provide sufficient information about differences in expected political survival. Furthermore, the staggered calendar of gubernatorial elections guarantees variation in the length of gubernatorial terms at the beginning of any given congressional term. These features make the Mexican political system an ideal place to study gubernatorial influence over legislative voting.8

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7The president, congressional representatives, and state legislatures have the ability to initiate legislation. Every bill is turned to a committee, which is required to report bills back to the floor within a certain period. In practice, committees exercise great discretion in the amount of time they keep bills off the floor (Nacif 2002).

8Díaz-Cayeros (2006, 141–2) employed the period left in governors’ terms—the same indicator we use here—to explain why the federal government was able to institute an allocation agreement that harmed the states’ fiscal interests in the late 1970s.
Our analysis is based on roll-call votes from three congressional terms—the LVIII (2000–2003), LIX (2003–2006), and LX (2006–2009) legislatures. As is common in other legislatures, a large proportion of votes are extremely consensual. In our analyses, we expunge all bills actively supported by a majority of 99% of legislators in the three major parties. This decision still leaves a high number of relatively consensual and therefore mildly informative votes in our data corresponding to bills that pass with the support of 95 to 99% of legislators in the three major parties. The method that we use to infer legislators’ ideal points appropriately discounts the amount of information provided by such consensual votes, thus obviating the need to weight them down.

Table 1 confirms that party discipline remains very high within the Mexican Congress. The top part of Table 1 displays the average proportion of legislators that voted with their party (% Aye), against their party (% Nay), or registered an abstention (% Abs); the complement to 100 is the average percentage of legislators absent from the floor on any given vote. These statistics provide a good sense of the differential ability of parties to impose voting discipline. In our models, we limit our focus to legislators from the three major parties. Even though legislators from small parties became increasingly numerous during the last decade, the size of state delegations from these parties is still too small to make meaningful statistical inference possible; furthermore, no state governorship has yet been captured by a small party. As expected, Mexican legislators vote with their caucus leadership more often than not and, though not obvious from inspection of Table 1, contentious votes often break down along party lines.

Consider now the distribution of governor term, the main independent variable in this study. We summarize this information graphically in Figure 1, where we identify the partisanship of Mexican governors with black (PRI), grey (PAN), and white (PRD) timelines. To explain our coding decisions consider the case of Baja California, the second state from the top in Figure 1. The graph indicates that the PAN governed this state at the beginning of the observation period in 2000 (grey line). The sitting governor, who had taken office in 1995, had one year left in his term before a new governor was sworn in. In consequence, the terms of legislators from Baja California outlast the governor’s term; this state’s delegations are all awarded a value of “1” and their voting record comprises the first two semesters of the LVIII legislature. Delegations starting in Congress with terms longer than the state’s governor are identified by a crossed pattern in Figure 1. A new PAN governor took office late in 2001; because at this point the governor had six years to go in his mandate, all party delegations from Baja California are awarded a value of “6” and their voting records comprise the remaining four semesters of the LVIII legislature. In other words, we code our observations as if this state had been represented by two separate sets of delegations during this legislature: the first set sat in Congress during the first two semesters of the LVIII legislature under a lame duck governor (crossed-out segment), whereas the second set was in Congress during the last four semesters of the LVIII legislature under a brand new governor. Consequently, we estimate two ideal points for each Baja Californian legislator: the first ideal point summarizes the legislator’s voting behavior under the first governor; the second one summarizes her voting behavior under the second governor.

\[ A \] a majority in one party votes against majorities in other parties ca. 20% of the time.

\[ B \] We add two caveats regarding governor partisanship. First, the Federal District has a jefe de gobierno rather than a governor, which is irrelevant for the purpose of this study. The first elected jefe, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, took office in 1997, but left two years into his tenure to contest presidential elections. Andrés Manuel López Obrador was elected in 2000, but also left early to contest presidential elections. Interim jefes Rosario Robles (1999–2000) and Alejandro Encinas (2005–2006) are not counted as new governors. We also ignore interim governors in Baja California, Chiapas, Colima, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Morelos, and Tabasco (these do not appear in Figure 1). Second, two governors (Salazar Mendiguchía in Chiapas and Echeverría Domínguez in Nayarit) ran supported by a coalition of PAN and PRD. We code the former as PRD and the latter as PAN.

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9We downloaded all registered votes from the official website of the Cámara de Diputados at gaceta.cddhcu.gob.mx and at www.diputados.gob.mx/Votaciones.htm. We thank Jeff Weldon for making us aware that procedural votes, votes on private bills, and votos en lo particular are not posted online (private communication and Weldon (2002)).

10Estimates of ideal points are not driven by a few legislators that were systematically against majorities in their party.

11Statistics in Table 1 are based on all votes, including extremely consensual ones. As is clear from the table, about 2% of all individual-level vote choices were registered as active abstentions (i.e., the legislator declares herself neither in favor nor against the bill). We recode abstentions as votes against the party majority (on this issue, see Weldon 2002). In contrast, we assume that absences produce missing values at random. The main effect of this decision is to increase estimation uncertainty about legislators’ ideal points.

12Some legislators started their stints in Congress as members of a major party but became independent at a later date. In these cases, we ignore the voting record of these legislators as of the moment they leave the parties under whose banners they were elected.
To substantiate the claim that the assignment of governor term is “as if” random, we broke down the characteristics of state-party delegations by length of governor term. Our original dataset comprises a total of 369 state-party delegations, 81 more than would obtain if the three major parties had representatives from all 32 states across all three legislatures (in practice, the PRD does not have delegations from all states). The large surplus follows from coding some state-party delegations as two different delegations whenever a new governor is elected midway through the legislature. We analyze a subset of 113 copartisan state-party delegations, i.e., state-party delegations that share party with the state’s governor. We divide these 113 state-party delegations according to whether their governor is scheduled to remain in power for at least three years (new governor) or not (lame duck governor) in order to see if the distribution of observable characteristics is similar across these two groups. Concerns about potential differences among these two groups are reasonable, considering that state-party delegations under lame duck governors comprise only about one third of all observations.

We find that delegations under lame duck governors are on average slightly smaller (7.3 ± 6.6 legislators) than delegations from states with new governors (9.4 ± 6.6), which suggests inclusion of delegation size as a control in our models. Even then, the difference in mean size is not statistically significant. The distribution of party membership of delegations among these two groups also appears at first sight to be different; in both groups, the PRI accounts for over half of the delegations, but PAN delegations are relatively more numerous than PRD delegations among states with lame duck governors. Be this as it may, we cannot reject the possibility that the distributions of delegation party membership under lame duck and under new governors are similar. Though there are no statistically discernible differences in the partisanship of delegations under new and lame duck governors, it is likely that relations between governors and federal representatives are different across parties. For example, PRD deputies tend to be members of strong internal factions, and PAN governors are somewhat constrained by a copartisan national executive (the PAN has held the Presidency since 2000). We prefer to be conservative and control for the party membership of delegations in our models, but our results hold when we omit this variable.

Table 1 Descriptive voting statistics, distribution of seats across major parties, and number of votes that provide information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Seats</td>
<td>% Aye % Nay % Abs</td>
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<td>64.7 6.7 1.1 203</td>
<td>57.4 4.8 0.9 106</td>
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<td>71.6 5.8 0.5 206</td>
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<td>61.7 7.0 1.3 97</td>
<td>55.6 10.7 1.9 127</td>
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<td>61</td>
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<td>Uninformative votes</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informative votes</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of votes</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15We code the state of origin of PR legislators as the state where they developed their political careers according to information in the Sistema de Información Legislativa (sil.gobernacion.gob.mx/portal) and Trejo Delarbre (2003). We failed to obtain this information for 14 legislators. In these cases, we coded the legislator’s state of birth as an indicator of state origin.

16We exclude state-party delegations that do not have a copartisan governor (say, the PAN delegation from PRI-governed State of Mexico), as our theory suggests that the governor’s influence is limited to copartisan deputies.

17The difference of means is not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level based on a two-tailed t-test (p-value=0.104). Moreover, we fail to find a statistically significant association between governor term (disaggregated) and delegation size.

18Among delegations with new governors, 42 are PRI, 17 are PAN, and 14 are PRD; among lame duck governors, the numbers are 22, 13, and 5, respectively. A test of the hypothesis that the frequency of party membership among delegations with lame duck governors is similar to the frequency of party membership among delegations with new governors yields $\chi^2_2 \approx 1.54$, with p-value 0.463.
Modeling Gubernatorial Effects on Congressional Voting Cohesion

How can we distinguish the effects of gubernatorial pressure from the effects of ideological similarities or constituent demands among legislators belonging to the same party and state? Following on the insight of Poole and Rosenthal (1997) we use ideal points based on roll-call data as a summary of legislators’ voting behavior. Our point of departure is the two-dimensional version of the Bayesian item-response theory model of Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004). Our decision to estimate two dimensions is based on the consensus that Mexican politics have been strongly patterned by a left-right distributive dimension (PRD, PRI, and PAN from left to right) and by an authoritarianism/democracy regime divide that pitted the hegemonic PRI against the erstwhile opposition parties (Domínguez and McCann 1996; Moreno 1998; Robles 2009). In the two-dimensional model, the probability that legislator $i$ will vote in favor of proposal $j$ (i.e., $y_{ij} = 1$) is a function of legislator-specific ideal points and item-specific parameters.$^{19}$ Estimating ideal points based on no information other than the legislators’ voting record is the first step of our analysis. In Figure 2 we show estimates of these ideal points. We mark with party-coded grey symbols the ideal points of all legislators. These plots confirm that legislators are relatively cohesive within parties, as

$^{19}$Formally, the model is $Pr(y_{ij} = 1) = \Phi(\beta_j x_{1i} + \beta_2 x_{2i} - \alpha_i)$, where $x$ contains ideal points and $\beta$ and $\alpha$ are item-specific parameters. We identify this model by fixing the discrimination parameters $\beta$ of four votes in each legislature; all other estimates are scaled in relation to these four points. The anchoring votes pit PAN–PRI against PRD along the first dimension and PRI against PAN–PRD along the second dimension. Two dimensions are clearly manifest in the LVIII and LIX legislatures, but the second dimension fails to discriminate among parties in the LX Legislature (see Figure 2). Descriptions of the posterior distribution of parameters are based on 500 draws from two chains thinned every 10th iteration after 50K burn-in scans (we use the Gelman-Rubin statistic to assess apparent convergence). Jags code for the MCMC sampler is available upon request.
in all legislatures we can more or less differentiate among clusters corresponding to PAN, PRI, and PRD. After accounting for between-party variation, however, within-party variation is still large. For example, within-party variation along the first dimension in Legislature LIX amounts to 30% of the total variance of ideal points along the first dimension. Ample within-party variation in ideal points makes it possible to explore potential state effects.

Indeed, the darker symbols overlaid on the legislators' ideal points show the centroids of state-party delegations, i.e., the average position of all legislators that belong to the same contingent. To find these centroids, we use information on the party membership and state of origin of legislators. In the bottom plots of Figure 2 we include uncertainty bounds about state-party delegation centroids; even after taking uncertainty into account, we notice that several state delegations within the same party display recognizably different voting behaviors. This is a crucial finding: if the national party caucus were the only actor with influence over legislators' votes, one could still see differences among the ideal points of individual legislators belonging to the same party, but one would not anticipate these ideal points to cluster within recognizable state contingents. Differences in the spatial location of state-party contingents, as captured by the darker symbols in Figure 2, arise because delegations from various states within the same party do not always vote in the same direction. With evidence of variation in the spatial location of state-party contingents at hand, one can at the very least confirm that some state-level political force has an effect on the propensity of copartisan legislators from the same state to vote together.

One could presumably inspect the distinct spatial positions of state-party delegations for traces of gubernatorial influence, but this is not the approach we employ here. Instead, we focus on a second meaning attached to the notion of “state effects.” This second meaning concerns the dispersion of legislators' ideal points around their state-party delegation, i.e., their degree of voting cohesion as a group. This second notion of state effects is recognized in the literature, and is in fact exploited by Jones and Hwang (2005) in their analysis of Argentina and by Cantú and Desposato (2009) in their study of Mexico. We also focus on the second meaning of state effects and model the dispersion of legislators around the ideal position of their state-party delegation. Thus, the second step in our analysis starts with the construction of variance statistics—which we refer to as delegation dispersion scores—for each state-party delegation. This step allows us to gauge the potential effect of governor term on the voting behavior of legislators.

If governors have the ability to sway the votes of their states' representatives in Congress, we would expect governor term to be a substantively significant predictor of delegation dispersion scores because governors with lengthy tenures are more likely to "take care" of their states' deputies than those who are leaving their posts. We thus regress delegation dispersion scores on governor term. The exogenous nature of governor term makes us confident that our estimates will not be biased by reverse causality or measurement error. However, we can still estimate the effect of gubernatorial influence more precisely by controlling for other factors that might affect voting cohesion, even if these are not correlated with governor term. Legislative partisanship and delegation size are two such factors. Political parties vary in the degree to which they are factionalized or centralized, and these characteristics can affect the ability of national party leaders to rein in ambitious copartisan governors. The size of the state-party delegation is an obvious control, because smaller delegations tend to have, by virtue of sheer chance, lower dispersion scores (Desposato 2003). None of these characteristics are correlated with governor term (see fn. 18), but including them in our regression models permits a more precise estimate of gubernatorial effects.

We recognize one additional methodological quandary in our effort to estimate gubernatorial effects. Because our dependent variable is constructed from uncertain estimates of ideal points, we need to account for this uncertainty in our models. We do so by drawing 500 different sets of delegation dispersion scores from the posterior distribution of ideal points. We then carry out an equal number of regressions, one for each set of delegation dispersion scores, on our independent variables. We report regression coefficients averaged over the 500 runs; reported standard errors appropriately account for this added source of uncertainty.

We estimate models of delegation dispersion based on all delegations, with at least two representatives.

---

20This statistic is the residual mean square of a regression of ideal points on party dummies divided by the variance of all ideal points, one per dimension. The corresponding statistics for all legislatures are: 16% and 20% (LVIII), 30% and 31% (LIX), and 13% and 85% (LX). As is obvious from inspection of the plots, party dummies have no predictive capability along the second dimension in the LX Legislature.

21For example, if the positions of three legislators from the same party-state delegation are (1,1), (2,2), and (1,2), the state-party delegation centroid is (4/3, 5/3).

22Cantu2009 provide evidence of differences in state-delegation Rice scores; in their analysis, voting cohesion is indeed higher for state-party delegations with copartisan governors.
FIGURE 2  Summaries of voting behavior in three legislatures. The top plots show ideal points of legislators (means of the posterior distribution plus 50% credible intervals). The bottom plots show ideal points of party-state delegations (averages of the distribution of ideal points of legislators within each party-state delegation ± 1 standard deviation).
whose party membership matches the party membership of their state’s governor (the average size of such delegations is 9.46 legislators). Thus, we pool together all PRI delegations from PRI-governed states, all PAN delegations from PAN-governed states, and all PRD delegations from PRD-governed states. This is because the mechanisms we hypothesize as driving gubernatorial effects—i.e., the governor’s ability to select congenial types ex ante and to reward good behavior ex post—should be most clearly seen amidst legislators who share a party with the governor. We expect governors with longer time horizons (governor term) to be able to impose voting homogeneity on state delegations, therefore depressing levels of delegation dispersion.

Table 2 displays OLS estimates of governor term effects and other parameters. We present four versions of the model, each based on dispersion scores along dimensions 1 and 2. Model 1 pools all available observations together, as explained before, whereas Models 2 to 4 are based exclusively on PRI, PAN, and PRD delegations, respectively. Based on the model that pools all observations together, we point out that delegation size is a positive and statistically significant predictor of dispersion, confirming the need to account in our models for the “size effect” noted by Desposato (2003). PAN delegations are on average less cohesive than PRI delegations along dimension 1, whereas PRD delegations are on average more cohesive than PRI delegations along dimension 2.

Net of the effects of delegation size and legislative party, we find that governor term is indeed a negative and statistically significant predictor of delegation dispersion. In other words, governors with longer time horizons in their posts preside over state-party delegations that show more cohesive voting behavior, all else constant. We consistently obtain negative coefficient estimates when we break delegations down by political parties in Models 2, 3, and 4—though the coefficient of governor term is not significant at conventional levels for PRD state-party delegations along dimension 1 and is significant only at the 93% level for PRI state-party delegations along dimension 2.

The models displayed in Table 2 are based on the voting records of both SMD and proportional representation legislators. In Mexico, PR legislators are elected in five circumscriptions of magnitude $M = 40$. Each circumscription contains several states, a feature that forced us to code the provenance of PR deputies as the state where they developed professionally (see fn. 16). We pool PR and SMD legislators together because governors are active both in placing SMD deputy candidates and negotiating many of the PR candidacies and because many of the PR representatives also return to their states after the end of their single terms in office (Langston and Aparicio 2008). Note also that because PR deputies may be disproportionately selected from individuals with careers tied to their national party organization, their inclusion in our analyses would presumably bias estimates against our expectation of finding sharp gubernatorial effects. However, we also reestimate our main model based exclusively on information from ideal points of SMD deputies (Model 5 in Table 2). We do this because SMD deputies are more likely to have been nominated by state elites and because these are the individuals for which state provenance information is most accurate. Though the number of legislators on which our results are based is diminished drastically, in practice we only lose ten state-party delegations—those made up exclusively of PR deputies or those where only one SMD deputy remains after excluding PR deputies. As can be seen in Model 5, this produces a mild efficiency loss in our estimates. Despite this loss, coefficient estimates for governor term remain of similar substantive magnitude and are still statistically significant.

23 We transform dispersion scores logarithmically to eliminate the skew produced by the zero bound on this indicator.

24 We standardized the posterior distributions of ideal points in order to pool delegation dispersion scores across legislatures. Because no single legislator could have voted in all three legislatures, we lacked a common anchor that would give us the ability to estimate ideal points on a common scale.

25 We offer four similar specifications in the online appendix, except we code governor term as a dichotomous indicator that takes the value of 1 when there are at least four years remaining in the governor’s term. Substantively, the results are identical to the ones presented in Table 2.

26 One-tailed $t$-tests for the relevant coefficients in the pooled model yield $p$-values of about 0.01 or smaller.

27 The fit of Model 4 is poor, as seen from adjusted $R^2$ and $F$ statistics; unfortunately, the number of PRD delegations from PRD-governed states is rather small.

28 As in our previous test, we consider whether the distributions of size and partisanship are balanced across delegations with new and with lame duck governors. In this case, delegation size is smaller among new (6.1 ± 5) than among lame duck governors (7 ± 6), but this difference is not statistically significant. There are no significant differences in the distributions of parties across delegations with new and lame duck governors.

29 As an additional robustness test, we included a dummy indicator to distinguish party-state contingents elected during the second half of the Fox administration (2003–2006). The rationale is that delegation scores could be much higher if legislators know that positions in the federal bureaucracy may open up as the non-renewable presidential term comes to an end. Including this indicator did not produce appreciable gains in the precision of our governor term coefficient estimates, and the coefficient on the dummy variable itself was not statistically significant.
Table 2  Predictors of *delegation dispersion* (log scale) along two dimensions. Models are based on delegations whose partisanship matches that of the state governor. Coefficients are OLS estimates (standard errors appropriately account for uncertainty in the estimation of ideal points).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pooled parties</td>
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<td>PRI</td>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.983†</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.174†</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.155†</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.703†</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.615†</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.322)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.166)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.688)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delegation size</td>
<td>0.034*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.023*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.057*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.017*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Governor term</td>
<td>-0.097*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.109*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.105*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.067*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.137</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
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<td>(0.032)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAN governor</td>
<td>1.225†</td>
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<td>0.252</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.330†</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.301</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
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<td>(0.256)</td>
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<td>(0.165)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRD governor</td>
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<td>-0.330†</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Adj. $R^2$</td>
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<td>0.205</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.360)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$F$-statistic</td>
<td>16.731</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.207</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.195</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.987</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.059</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(113)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(113)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(64)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p-value < 0.05, one-tailed test; †p-value < 0.05, two-tailed test.
To assess the relative magnitude of estimated effects, recall that we scaled ideal points to have unit variance. The coefficient estimate for governor term in Model 1 suggests that a governor starting her term will be able to reduce the dispersion scores of state delegations by almost half the variance of ideal points compared to a lame duck governor with one year left. Based on estimates in Model 1, Figure 3 shows graphically the effect of governor term on dispersion scores of delegations from the three major parties. In each plot, ellipses represent the expected dispersion scores of average PRI, PAN, and PRD delegations from states governed by their own party; the dotted ellipses across all plots have constant size and represent the cohesion of an average delegation of the corresponding party. The three plots correspond to expected dispersion scores under a lame duck governor (governor term = 1 in the left-most panel), a governor whose term will barely outlast the legislative term of the state’s delegations (governor term = 3.5, center), and a new governor (governor term = 6, right). The numbers in the center of the color regions show the ratio of the area of the color ellipse to the area of the dotted ellipse. This ratio clearly conveys the substantive impact of gubernatorial influence. For example, the dispersion score of a PAN delegation under a lame duck governor is twice as large as the dispersion score of the average PAN delegation (2.01). We would expect the dispersion score of the same PAN delegation to drop to slightly more than two-thirds of the score of an average PAN delegation under a brand-new governor (0.72). As is clear from Figure 3, a similar impact obtains across all parties even after accounting for differences across legislative parties.

The effect of governor term on the voting cohesion of state-party delegations should be predominantly observed among state delegations from the governor’s own party and not on deputies from the same state but from different parties. Still, we checked whether governors systematically affected the voting cohesion of legislators from their states that did not belong to their own party, which created six potential combinations of delegation and governor parties (i.e., PRD delegations from PRI-governed states, PRI delegations from PAN-governed states, etc.) along both dimensions, estimating the effect of governor term while controlling for delegation size. For most of these models, the estimated coefficients on governor term were negative but statistically insignificant at conventional levels with one exception: the effect of governor term on voting cohesion is negative and statistically significant when considering the interaction of PRI governors with PRD delegations (along both dimensions) or with PAN delegations (along the second dimension). These effects were not substantively large for PAN delegations, but they were relatively sizeable for PRD delegations. This is a surprising finding: we think it possible that politically savvy governors (especially from the PRI) could influence the voting behavior of state delegations from the PRD, because the members of the PRD share so few copartisan governors and as a result find it necessary to cut deals with governors from other parties to survive politically. Indeed, we find evidence that returning legislators from other parties, especially those from the PRD, benefit as well from the governors’ largesse. An alternative possibility is that PRD deputies vote cohesively against new governors from other parties. Without careful examination of the ideological location of state-party delegations—a task we leave for future work—we cannot conclusively arbitrate between these hypotheses.

**Conclusion**

We have proposed a strategy to uncover potential gubernatorial effects in the voting behavior of legislators in a federal democracy, one with relatively high degrees of national party discipline. Following Jones and Hwang (2005), we use information from roll-call votes to estimate legislator ideal points which we then use to build state-party delegation dispersion scores that are modeled as a function of gubernatorial time horizons. Our research design takes advantage of constitutional features of the Mexican political system to gauge gubernatorial influence over the cohesion of state-party delegations: because the lengths of the political careers of governors and legislators are exogenously set by electoral laws, we can more credibly estimate gubernatorial effects on legislative voting. We conclude that gubernatorial effects are indeed discernible in the voting behavior of state delegations, even in the face of high national voting cohesion. In a political system where, barely two decades ago, presidents could credibly threaten to remove problematic governors, we

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30 We have information about the first job that all 1,168 deputies serving between 1997 and 2006 obtained upon leaving Congress. Among these, 583 were “political orphans” in that their state’s governor belonged to a party different than their own. Most of these orphans return to their states seeking jobs in municipal offices, state government offices or their party’s state organization. Orphans thus have an incentive to maintain a cordial relation with their state’s governor when possible. We find that a relatively large proportion of PRD orphans obtained a position in state government (21%) while PAN and PRI orphans got state positions at lower rates (13% and 4%, respectively).
find ample evidence that governors with longer time horizons presided over more cohesive state-party delegations than governors at the end of their terms. They do this even as national party leaders are able to keep legislators voting together more often than not. This finding suggests that governors are capable of affecting national legislation through the votes of their states’ delegates. It also shows that measuring state effects can be fruitfully undertaken in more than one way: to capture the ability of governors to minimize dispersion in their state-party delegations, regardless of whether this affects national voting cohesion, is an important step forward (see also Cantú and Desposato 2009; Cheibub, Figueiredo, and Limongi 2009; Jones and Hwang 2005).

The characteristics of the Mexican case that allow us to identify with high precision the extent of gubernatorial influence on legislators’ voting behavior are not easily found elsewhere, but the basic structure of interaction among governors, deputies, and national party leaders that we see in Mexico is of course a defining feature of many federal regimes. Therefore, the Mexican case is important because the particular constitutional combination of no consecutive reelection and staggered electoral calendar for governors allows us to precisely measure what most likely exists in other federal nations, but is difficult to observe. We still do not know the conditions under which governors will choose to reach out to sway the voting behavior of their states’ representatives in Congress. For starters, we do not believe that it is always in the interest of governors to break ranks with their parties’ legislative leaders. Governors, in Mexico and elsewhere, mostly care about claiming success for redistributing resources from the federal to the state level via the annual budget negotiations, which means that they may focus selectively on wielding state votes in budget matters, tax bills, or distributive concerns and submit to their party’s caucus leadership on all other matters. We hasten to add that even strong governors with policy preferences inconsistent with those of their copartisans may decide against swaying the votes of their state delegation if this means breaking with the party line. Governors, like other politicians, derive benefits from being associated with a recognizable party label and so will break ranks as infrequently as possible. Governors may thus choose to selectively delegate to the caucus leader the power to whip state delegations, which is in essence the dynamic of “conditional party government” that Jones and Hwang (2005) have recognized in Argentina’s congress and that is likely to exist in other federal regimes. Without a doubt, future research would benefit from theoretically guided arguments about the conditions under which we could expect governors to work together with party leaders in promoting the party’s brand name. Knowing with high certainty that gubernatorial effects exist should provide researchers with the impetus to carry out such work.

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